Re: [A-List] On the Role of Gold

["Anne Williamson" <annewilliamson@xxxxxxx>]

Henry chastized me over the weekend (in a post I just read) for saying that
the playing field is never going to be level at any given time.  He first
equated my statement to the idea that there will always be poor people.

Well, there always have been and I am aware of no society ever that has
eliminated poverty.  In fact, efforts like the "War on Poverty" are
dangerous, because to give a coercive power (the state) a vested interest in
poor people will only guarantee an increasing number of poor people (why do
you think there were television ads during the Carter administration for
food stamps?  Bureaucrats must justify their jobs and their agencies'
funding, and in the case of the War on Poverty that meant govt had a need
for poor people, and very much in poor people who never stopped being poor).

Henry asserts that "government exists to provide a level playing field."
Yeah, well maybe in the Henry theory of the state it does, but in real life
throughout history govt has justified its existence upon the premise of
defending the life and property of its subjects.  Guaranteeing results (if
that was Henry's point, and I'm not sure it was) by enforcing a "level
playing field" only works to establish tyranny.  Guaranteeing equality
before the law is a useful service, but never realized within a
state-sponsored judicial system which always favors its own interests, not
those of the citizen.

Henry then asserts that capitalism is not a game that can be played without
capital.  Wrong.  Capitalism requires private property and the right of
contract, money can always be obtained through labor and saving - but
without private property rights, all the sound money in the world will bring
nothing to any player.  Poverty is the natural state of mankind; what is
remarkable is the number of people and nations that have created wealth.
The formula isn't rocket science:  private property, the right of contract,
sound money, and limited government. And we are not living in a capitalist
system; the Western system is a corporate state through institutions founded
in the New Deal which were inspired by the policies of Benito Mussolini.
(New Dealers admit this, btw.)

Other assertions with which I can not concur and see no evidence to support
and for which none was given:

"A police force is infinitely more efficient than a private security force."
I couldn't disagree more! A police force has no obligation to protect
citizens, or didn't you know that?  The police exist to protect the
interests of the state.  Just try suing a police department because you
suffered some injury due to their neglect or inattention and the nice
attorneys representing the police force will explain the truth to you.  The
judge will confirm what the attorneys tell you if you persist in your suit.

"Government produces security, order, fairness and public good." (Where?
When?  Govt claims to provide such things, but never does.  Security?  I'm
at risk every moment as a New Yorker thanks to Fedgov's "foreign policy."
2700 of us were slaughtered not too long ago, it will be recalled.  Well to
respond to the above in full would take volumes; the assertion simply isn't
true or even demonstrable. Reading Henry's assertion, I couldn't help
recalling what Ghandi said when asked what he thought of Western
civilization - "I think it's a good idea.")

"Statism is the sign of civilization." No, statism wherever practised is the
indicator of a lack of civilization and of morals.  How could it be
otherwise since it is a philosophy that maintains that your life, money, and
property are not yours and their dispensation is controlled not by you, but
by the state.  No thanks.  Ted Kennedy can't even govern himself, and he
certainly should have no power over any other human being on the planet.
Admittedly, what I said of Ted can be said of any political figure, but not
all are such an obvious and irrefutable target.

But the state has done one job magnificently, i.e., killing its own
citizens.  170 MILLION in the 20th century alone!!!

No, libertarians are not like teen-agers "who complain about their parents
while accepting all the benefit provided by their parents as a given right."
The state is not a set of parents, firstly, and secondly, all libertarians
would willingly and immediately give up the alleged "benefits" which are -
in fact - thefts and distortions.

Private enterprise is so superior to state action that it can hardly be
argued.  Fed-Ex or the post office?  I do, however, very much agree that the
state, always eager for funds, does allow certain private enterprises
(banking especially) to dump unprofitable liabilities onto the public
sector - I've written an entire book on the subject.  But this is a
consequence of state intervention on behalf of contributors!

As for property rights and liberty, see below.

Anne

***********************************************************

Rothbardian Ethics
by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

The Problem of Social Order

Robinson Crusoe, alone on his island, can do whatever he pleases. For him,
the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct – social
cooperation – simply does not arise. Naturally, this question can only
arise once a second person, Friday, arrives on the island. Yet even then,
the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists.
Suppose the island is the Garden of Eden. All external goods are available
in superabundance. They are "free goods," such as the air that we breathe is
normally a "free" good. Whatever Crusoe does with these goods, his actions
have repercussions neither with respect of his own future supply of such
goods, nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods for
Friday (and vice versa). Hence, it is impossible that there could ever be a
conflict between Crusoe and Friday concerning the use of such goods. A
conflict becomes possible only if goods are scarce, and only then can there
arise a problem of formulating rules which make an orderly –
conflict-free – social cooperation possible.

In the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist: the physical body of a
person and its standing room. Crusoe and Friday each have only one body and
can stand only at one place at a time. Hence, even in the Garden of Eden
conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise: Crusoe and Friday cannot both
simultaneously want to occupy the same standing room without coming thereby
into physical conflict with each other. Accordingly, even in the Garden of
Eden rules of orderly social conduct must exist – rules regarding the
proper location and movement of human bodies. And outside the Garden of
Eden, in the realm of scarcity, there must be rules that regulate not just
the use of personal bodies but of everything scarce so that all possible
conflicts can be ruled out. This is the problem of social order.

The Problem Solution: The Idea of Original Appropriation and Private
Property

In the history of social and political thought many proposals have been
advanced as an alleged solution to the problem of social order, and this
variety of mutually inconsistent proposals has contributed to the fact that
today the search for a single "correct" problem solution is frequently
deemed illusory. Yet as I will try to demonstrate, there exists a correct
solution; and hence, there is no reason to succumb to moral relativism. I
did not discover this solution, nor did Murray Rothbard, for that matter.
Rather, the solution has been essentially known for hundreds of years if not
for much longer. Murray Rothbard’s claim to fame is "merely" that he
rediscovered this old as well as simple solution and formulated it more
clearly and convincingly than anyone before him.

Let me begin in formulating the solution – first for the special case
represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the general case
represented by the "real" world of all-around scarcity – and then proceed
to the explanation of why this solution, and no other one, is correct.

In the Garden of Eden, the solution is provided by the simple rule
stipulating that everyone may place or move his own body wherever he
pleases, provided only that no one else is already standing there and
occupying the same space. And outside of the Garden of Eden, in the realm of
all-around scarcity, the solution is provided by this rule: Everyone is the
proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and
nature-given goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body,
provided only that no one else has already occupied or used the same places
and goods before him. This ownership of "originally appropriated" places and
goods by a person implies his right to use and transform these places and
goods in any way he sees fit, provided only that he does not change thereby
uninvitedly the physical integrity of places and goods originally
appropriated by another person. In particular, once a place or good has been
first appropriated by, in John Locke’s phrase, "mixing one’s labor" with
it, ownership in such places and goods can be acquired only by means of a
voluntary – contractual – transfer of its property title from a previous
to a later owner.

In light of wide-spread moral relativism, it is worth while to point out
that this idea of original appropriation and private property as a solution
to the problem of social order is in complete accordance with our moral
"intuition." Isn’t it simply absurd to claim that a person should not be
the proper owner of his body and the places and goods that he originally,
i.e., prior to anyone else, appropriates, uses and/or produces by means of
his body? For who else, if not he, should be their owner? And isn’t it also
obvious that the overwhelming majority of people – including children and
primitives – act in fact according to these rules, and do so
unquestioningly and as a matter-of-course?

A moral intuition, as important as it is, is not a proof, however. Yet there
also exists proof of our moral intuition being correct.

The proof can be provided in a twofold manner. On the one hand, in spelling
out the consequences that follow if one were to deny the validity of the
institution of original appropriation and private property: If a person A
were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally
appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods
voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only
two alternatives exist. Either another person B must be recognized as the
owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or
acquired by A. Or else all persons, A and B, must be considered equal
co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.

In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object
of exploitation. B is the owner of A’s body and all places and goods
appropriated, produced, and acquired by A, but A in turn is not the owner of
B’s body and the places and goods appropriated, produced and acquired by B.
Hence, under this ruling two categorically distinct classes of persons are
constituted – Untermenschen such as A and Ubermenschen such as B – to whom
different "laws" apply. Accordingly, such ruling must be discarded as a
human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational
animal). From the very outset, any such ruling can be recognized as not
universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law. Because for a
rule to aspire to the rank of a law – a just rule – it is necessary that
such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone.

Alternatively, in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership the
requirement of equal law for everyone is fulfilled. However, this
alternative suffers from another, even more severe deficiency, because if it
were applied all of mankind would instantly perish. (And since every human
ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative, then, must be
rejected, too.) For every action of a person requires the use of some scarce
means (at least the person’s body and its standing room). But if all goods
were co-owned by everyone, then no one, at no time and no place, would be
allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co-owner
’s consent to do so; and yet, how can anyone grant such consent if he were
not the exclusive owner of his own body (including his vocal chords) by
means of which his consent must be expressed? Indeed, he would first need
others’ consent in order to be allowed to express his own, but these others
cannot give their consent without having first his, etc.

This insight into the praxeological impossibility of "universal communism,"
as Rothbard referred to this proposal, brings me immediately to a second,
alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and
private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social
order. Whether or not persons have any rights and, if so, which ones, can
only be decided in the course of argumentation (propositional exchange).
Justification – proof, conjecture, refutation – is argumentative
justification. Anyone who were to deny this proposition would become
involved in a performative contradiction, because his denial would itself
constitute an argument. Even an ethical relativist, then, must accept this
first proposition, which has been accordingly referred to as the a priori of
argumentation.

>From the undeniable acceptance – the axiomatic status – of this a priori
of argumentation in turn two equally necessary conclusions follow. First, it
follows from the a priori of argumentation when there is no rational
solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity.
Suppose in my earlier scenario of Crusoe and Friday, that Friday was not the
name of a man but of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe can run into
conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so he
might do so with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy the
same space that Crusoe is already occupying. In this case, at least if the
gorilla is the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be, there is in fact
no rational solution to their conflict. Either the gorilla wins, and
devours, crushes, or pushes Crusoe aside – that is the gorilla’s solution
to the problem – or Crusoe wins, and kills, beats, chases away, or tames
the gorilla – that is Crusoe’s solution. In this situation, one may indeed
speak of moral relativism. With Alasdair MacIntyre, a prominent philosopher
of the relativist persuasion, one may concur asking as the title of one of
his books, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? – Crusoe’s or the gorilla’s.
Depending on whose side one chooses, the answer will be different. However,
it is more appropriate to refer to this situation as one where the question
of justice and rationality simply does not arise: that is, as an extra-moral
situation. The existence of Friday the gorilla poses for Crusoe merely a
technical problem, not a moral one. Crusoe has no other choice but to learn
how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as
he must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of his
environment.

By implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging
in argumentation with one another, can one speak of a moral problem and is
the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful. Only if
Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether he looks like a
man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown
himself to be so capable only once), can he be deemed rational and does the
question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order
exists make sense. No one can be expected to give an answer – indeed: any
answer – to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the point,
who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an
argument. In that case, this "other" cannot but be regarded and treated like
an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity. Only if this other
entity can in principle pause in his activity, whatever it might be, step
back so to speak, and say "yes" or "no" to something one has said, do we owe
this entity an answer and, accordingly, can we possibly claim that our
answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict.

Moreover, secondly and positively it follows from the a priori of
argumentation that everything that must be presupposed in the course of an
argumentation – as the logical and praxeological precondition of
argumentation – cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed as regards its
validity without becoming thereby entangled in an internal (performative)
contradiction. Now, propositional exchanges are not made up of free-floating
propositions, but rather constitute a specific human activity. Argumentation
between Crusoe and Friday requires that both possess, and mutually recognize
each other as possessing, exclusive control over their respective bodies
(their brain, vocal chords, etc.) as well as the standing room occupied by
their bodies. No one could propose anything and expect the other party to
convince himself of the validity of this proposition or else deny it and
propose something else, unless his and his opponent’s right to exclusive
control over their respective bodies and standing rooms were already
presupposed and assumed as valid. In fact, it is precisely this mutual
recognition of the proponent’s as well as the opponent’s property in his
own body and standing room which constitutes the characteristicum specificum
of all propositional disputes: that while one may not agree regarding the
validity of some specific proposition one can agree nonetheless on the fact
that one disagrees.

Moreover, this right to property in one’s own body and its standing room
must be considered a priori (or indisputably) justified by proponent and
opponent alike. For anyone who wanted to claim any proposition as valid
vis-a-vis an opponent would already have to presuppose his and his opponent
’s exclusive control over their respective body and standing room simply in
order to say "I claim such and such to be true, and I challenge you to prove
me wrong." [So much for John Rawls’ claim, in his celebrated Theory of
Justice, that we cannot but "acknowledge as the first principle of justice
one requiring an equal distribution (of all resources)," and his comment
that "this principle is so obvious that we would expect it to occur to
anyone immediately." What I have demonstrated here is that any egalitarian
ethic such as this proposed by Rawls is not only not obvious but must be
regarded instead as absurd, i.e., as self-contradictory nonsense. For if
Rawls were right and all resources were indeed equally distributed, then he
literally would have no leg to stand on and support him in proposing the
very nonsense that he does pronounce.]

Furthermore, it would be equally impossible to engage in argumentation and
rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments, if one were not allowed
to own (exclusively control) other scarce means (besides one’s body and its
standing room). For if one did not have such a right, then we would all
immediately perish and the problem of justifying rules – as well as any
other human problem – simply would not exist. Hence, by virtue of the fact
of being alive property rights to other things must be presupposed as valid,
too. No one who is alive could possibly argue otherwise.

And if a person were not permitted to acquire property in these goods and
spaces by means of an act of original appropriation, i.e., by establishing
an objective (intersubjectively ascertainable) link between himself and a
particular good and/or space prior to anyone else, but if, instead, property
in such goods or spaces were granted to late-comers, then no one would be
permitted to ever begin using any good unless he had previously secured such
late-comers consent. Yet how can a late-comer consent to the actions of an
early-comer? Moreover, every late-comer would in turn need the consent of
other still later-comers, and so on. That is, neither we, nor our
forefathers or our progeny would have been or will be able to survive if one
were to follow this rule. However, in order for any person – past, present,
or future – to argue anything it must be obviously possible to survive then
and now; and in order to do just this property rights cannot be conceived of
as being timeless and unspecific with respect to the number of persons
concerned.

Rather, property rights must necessarily be conceived of as originating by
acting at definite points in time and space for definite individuals.
Otherwise it would be impossible for anyone to ever say anything at a
definite point in time and space and for someone else to be able to reply.
Simply saying, then, that the first-user-first-owner rule of the ethics of
private property can be ignored or is unjustified, implies a performative
contradiction, as one’s being able to say so must presuppose one’s
existence as an independent decision-making unit at a given point in time
and space.

Simple Solution, Radical Conclusions: Anarchy and State

As simple as the solution to the problem of social order is and as much as
people in their daily lives intuitively recognize and act according to the
ethics of private property just explained, this simple and undemanding
solution implies some surprisingly radical conclusions. For, apart from
ruling out as unjustified all activities such as murder, homicide, rape,
trespass, robbery, burglary, theft, and fraud, the ethics of private
property is also incompatible with the existence of a state defined as an
agency that possesses a compulsory territorial monopoly of ultimate
decision-making (jurisdiction) and/or the right to tax.

Classical political theory, at least from Hobbes onward, had viewed the
state as the very institution responsible for the enforcement of the ethics
of private property. In regarding the state as unjust – indeed, as "a vast
criminal organization" – and reaching anarchist conclusions instead,
Rothbard did of course not deny the necessity of enforcing the ethics of
private property. He did not share the view of those anarchists, ridiculed
by his teacher and mentor Mises, who believed that all people, if only left
alone, would be good and peace-loving creatures.

To the contrary, Rothbard wholeheartedly agreed with Mises that there will
always be murderers, thieves, thugs, con-artists, etc., and that life in
society would be impossible if they were not punished by physical force.
Rather, what Rothbard categorically denied, was the claim that it followed
from the right and need for the protection of person and property that
protection rightfully should or effectively could be provided by a
monopolist of jurisdiction and taxation. Classical political theory, in
making this claim, had to present the state as the result of a contractual
agreement among private property owners. Yet this, Rothbard argued, was
false and an impossible undertaking. No state can possibly arise
contractually, and accordingly it can be demonstrated that no state is
compatible with the rightful and effective protection of private property.

Private-property ownership, as the result of acts of original appropriation,
production, or exchange from prior to later owner, implies the owner’s
right to exclusive jurisdiction regarding his property; and no private
property owner can possibly surrender his right to ultimate jurisdiction
over and physical defense of his property to someone else – unless he sold
or otherwise transferred his property (in which case someone else would have
exclusive jurisdiction over it). To be sure, every private property owner
may partake of the advantages of the division of labor and seek more or
better protection of his property through the cooperation with other owners
and their property. That is, every property owner may buy from, sell to, or
otherwise contract with anyone else concerning more or better property
protection. But every property owner also may at any time unilaterally
discontinue any such cooperation with others or change his respective
affiliations. Hence, in order to meet the demand for protection it would be
rightfully possible and is economically likely that specialized individuals
and agencies arise which provide protection, insurance, and arbitration
services for a fee to voluntarily paying clients.

However, while it is easy to conceive of the contractual origin of a system
of competitive security suppliers, it is inconceivable how private property
owners could possibly enter a contract that entitled another agent
irrevocably (once and for all) with the power of ultimate decision-making
regarding his own person and property and/or the power to tax. That is, it
is inconceivable how anyone could ever agree to a contract that allowed
someone else to determine permanently what he may or may not do with his
property; for in so doing this person would have effectively rendered
himself defenseless vis-a-vis such an ultimate decision maker. And likewise
is it inconceivable how anyone could ever agree to a contract that allowed
one’s protector to determine unilaterally, without consent of the
protected, the sum that the protected must pay for his protection.

Orthodox, i.e., statist, political theorists, from John Locke to James
Buchanan and John Rawls, have tried to solve this difficulty through the
make-shift of "tacit," "implicit," or "conceptual" agreements, contracts, or
state-constitutions. All of these characteristically tortuous and confused
attempts, however, have only added to the same unavoidable conclusion drawn
by Rothbard: That it is impossible to derive a justification for government
from explicit contracts between private property owners, and hence, that the
institution of the state must be considered unjust, i.e., the result of
moral error.

The Consequence of Moral Error: Statism and the Destruction of Liberty and
Property

All errors are costly. This is most obvious with errors concerning laws of
nature. If a person errs regarding laws of nature this person will not be
able to reach his own goals. However, because the failure of doing so must
be born by each erring individual, there prevails in this realm a universal
desire to learn and correct one’s errors. Moral errors are costly, too.
Unlike in the former case, however, their cost must not, at least not
necessarily so, be paid for by each and every person committing the error.
In fact, this would be the case only if the error involved were that of
believing that everyone had the right to tax and ultimate decision-making
regarding the person and property of everyone else. A society whose members
believed this would be doomed. The price to be paid for this error would be
universal death and extinction. However, matters are distinctly different if
the error involved is that of believing that one agency – the state – only
has the right to tax and ultimate decision-making (rather than everyone, or
else, and correctly so, no one). A society whose members believed this –
that is, that there must be different laws applying unequally to masters and
serfs, taxers and taxed, legislators and legislated – can in fact exist and
endure. This error must be paid for, too. But not everyone holding this
error must pay for it equally. Rather, some people will have to pay for it,
while others – the agents of the state – actually benefit from the same
error. Hence, in this case it would be mistaken to assume a universal desire
to learn and correct one’s errors. To the contrary, in this case it will
have to be assumed that some people, rather than learning and promoting the
truth, have a constant motive to lie, i.e., to maintain and promote
falsehoods even if they themselves recognize them as such.

In any case, then, what are the "mixed" consequences of, and what is the
unequal price to be paid for, the error and/or lie of believing in the
justice of the institution of a state?

Once the principle of government – judicial monopoly and the power to
tax – is incorrectly admitted as just, any notion of restraining government
power and safeguarding individual liberty and property is illusory. Rather,
under monopolistic auspices the price of justice and protection will
continually rise and the quality of justice and protection fall. A
tax-funded protection agency is a contradiction in terms – an expropriating
property protector – and will inevitably lead to more taxes and less
protection. Even if, as some – classical liberal – statists have proposed,
a government limited its activities exclusively to the protection of
pre-existing private property rights, the further question of how much
security to produce would arise. Motivated (like everyone else) by
self-interest and the disutility of labor, but endowed with the unique power
to tax, a government agent’s answer will invariably be the same: To
maximize expenditures on protection – and almost all of a nation’s wealth
can conceivably be consumed by the cost of protection – and at the same
time to minimize the production of protection. The more money one can spend
and the less one must work to produce, the better off one will be.

Moreover, a judicial monopoly will inevitably lead to a steady deterioration
in the quality of justice and protection. If no one can appeal to justice
except to government, justice will be perverted in favor of the government,
constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding. Constitutions and supreme
courts are state constitutions and agencies, and whatever limitations to
state action they might contain or find is invariably decided by agents of
the very institution under consideration. Predictably, the definition of
property and protection will continually be altered and the range of
jurisdiction expanded to the government’s advantage until, ultimately, the
notion of universal and immutable human rights – and in particular property
rights – will disappear and be replaced by that of law as government-made
legislation and rights as government-given grants.

The results, all of them predicted by Rothbard, are before our eyes, for
everyone to see. The tax load imposed on property owners and producers has
continually increased, making the economic burden even of slaves and serfs
seem moderate in comparison. Government debt – and hence, future tax
obligations – has risen to breathtaking heights. Every detail of private
life, property, trade, and contract is regulated by ever higher mountains of
paper laws. Yet the only task that government was ever supposed to assume –
of protecting our life and property – it does not perform. To the contrary,
the higher the expenditures on social, public, and national security have
risen, the more our private property rights have been eroded, the more our
property has been expropriated, confiscated, destroyed, and depreciated. The
more paper laws have been produced, the more legal uncertainty and moral
hazard has been created, and lawlessness has displaced law and order.
Instead of protecting us from domestic crime and foreign aggression, our
government, equipped with enormous stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction, aggresses against ever new Hitlers and suspected Hitlerite
sympathizers anywhere and everywhere outside of its "own" territory. In
short, while we have become ever more helpless, impoverished, threatened,
and insecure, our state rulers have become increasingly more corrupt,
arrogant, and dangerously armed.

The Restoration of Morality: On Liberation

What to do, then? Rothbard has not only reconstructed the ethics of liberty
and explained the current morass as the result of statism, he has also shown
us the way toward a restoration of morals.

First and foremost he has explained that states, as powerful and invincible
as they might seem, ultimately owe their existence to ideas and, since ideas
can in principle change instantaneously, states can be brought down and
crumble practically over night.

The representatives of the state are always and everywhere only just a small
minority of the population over which they rule. The reason for this is as
simple as it is fundamental: one hundred parasites can live comfortable
lives if they suck out the life blood of thousands of productive hosts, but
thousands of parasites cannot live comfortably off of a host population of
just a hundred. Yet if government agents are merely a small minority of the
population, how can they enforce their will on this population and get away
with it? The answer given by Rothbard as well as de la Boetie, Hume, and
Mises before him, is: only by virtue of the voluntary cooperation of the
majority of the subject population with the state. Yet how can the state
secure such cooperation? The answer is: only because and insofar as the
majority of the population believes in the legitimacy of state rule. This is
not to say that the majority of the population must agree with every single
state measure. Indeed, it may well believe that many state policies are
mistaken or even despicable. However, the majority of the population must
believe in the justice of the institution of the state as such, and hence,
that even if a particular government goes wrong, these mistakes are merely
accidents which must be accepted and tolerated in view of some greater good
provided by the institution of government.

Yet how can the majority of the population be brought to believe this? The
answer is: with the help of the intellectuals. In the old days that meant
trying to mold an alliance between the state and the church. In modern times
and far more effectively, this means through the nationalization
(socialization) of education: through state-run or state-subsidized schools
and universities. The market demand for intellectual services, in particular
in the area of the humanities and social sciences, is not exactly high and
none too stable and secure. Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the
values and choices of the masses, and the masses are generally uninterested
in intellectual-philosophical concerns. The state, on the other hand, notes
Rothbard, accommodates their typically overinflated egos and "is willing to
offer the intellectuals a warm, secure, and permanent berth in its
apparatus, a secure income, and the panoply of prestige." And indeed, the
modern democratic state in particular, has created a massive oversupply of
intellectuals.

This accommodation does not guarantee "correct" – statist – thinking, of
course; and as well and generally overpaid as they are, intellectuals will
continue to complain how little their oh-so-important work is appreciated by
the powers that be. But it certainly helps in reaching the "correct"
conclusions if one realizes that without the state – the institution of
taxation and legislation – one might be out of work and may have to try one
’s hands at the mechanics of gas pump operation instead of concerning
oneself with such pressing problems as alienation, equity, exploitation, the
deconstruction of gender and sex roles, or the culture of the Eskimos, the
Hopis, and the Zulus. And even if one feels underappreciated by this or that
incumbent government, one still realizes that help can only come from
another government, and certainly not from an intellectual assault on the
legitimacy of the institution of government as such. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that, as a matter of empirical fact, the overwhelming majority of
contemporary intellectuals are far-out lefties and that even most
conservative or free market intellectuals such as Friedman or Hayek, for
instance, are fundamentally and philosophically statists.

>From this insight into the importance of ideas and the role of intellectuals
as bodyguards of the state and statism, then, it follows that the most
decisive role in the process of liberation – the restoration of justice and
morality – must fall on the shoulders of what one might call
anti-intellectual intellectuals. Yet how can such anti-intellectual
intellectuals possibly succeed in delegitimating the state in public
opinion, especially if the overwhelming majority of their colleagues are
statists and will do everything in their power to isolate and discredit them
as extremists and crackpots? Time permits me to make only a few brief
comments on this fundamental question.

First: Because one must reckon with the vicious opposition from one’s
colleagues, and in order to withstand it, and to shrug it off, it is of
utmost importance to ground one’s case not in economics and utilitarianism,
but in ethics and moral arguments. For only moral convictions provide one
with the courage and strength needed in ideological battle. Few are inspired
and willing to accept sacrifices if what they are opposed to is mere error
and waste. More inspiration and courage can be drawn from knowing that one
is engaged in fighting evil and lies. (I’ll return to this shortly.)

Second: It is important to recognize that one does not need to convert one’
s colleagues, i.e., to persuade mainstream intellectuals. As Thomas Kuhn has
shown, this is rare enough even in the natural sciences. In the social
sciences, conversions among established intellectuals from previously held
views are almost unheard of. Instead, one should concentrate one’s efforts
on the not-yet intellectually committed young, whose idealism makes them
also particularly receptive to moral arguments and moral rigorism. And
likewise, one should circumvent academia and reach out to the general public
(i.e., to the educated laymen), which entertains some generally healthy
anti-intellectual prejudices into which one can easily tap.

Third (returning to the importance of a moral attack on the state): It is
essential to recognize that there can be no compromise on the level of
theory. To be sure, one should not refuse to cooperate with people whose
views are ultimately mistaken and confused, provided that their objectives
can be classified, clearly and unambiguously, as a step in the right
direction of the de-statization of society. For instance, one would not want
to refuse cooperation with people who seek to introduce a flat income tax of
10 percent (although we would not want to cooperate with those who would
want to combine this measure with an increased sales tax in order to achieve
revenue neutrality, for instance). However, under no circumstances should
such cooperation lead to or be achieved by compromising one’s own
principles. Either taxation is just or it isn’t. And once it is admitted as
just, how is one then to oppose any increase in it? The answer is of course
that one can’t!

Put differently, compromise on the level of theory, as we find it, for
instance, among moderate free-marketeers such as Hayek or Friedman or even
among the so-called minarchists, is not only philosophically flawed but is
also practically ineffective and indeed counterproductive. Their ideas can
be – and in fact are – easily co-opted and incorporated by the state
rulers and statist ideology. Indeed, how often do we hear nowadays from
statists and in defense of a statist agenda cries such as "even Hayek
(Friedman) says, or, not even Hayek (Friedman) denies that such and such
must be done by the state!" Personally, they may not be happy about this,
but there is no denying that their work lends itself to this purpose, and
hence, that they, willy-nilly, actually contributed to the continued and
unabating growth of state power.

In other words: Theoretical compromise or gradualism will only lead to the
perpetuation of the falsehood, evils, and lies of statism, and only
theoretical purism, radicalism, and intransigence can and will lead first to
gradual practical reform and improvement and possibly final victory.
Accordingly, as an anti-intellectual intellectual in the Rothbardian sense
one can never be satisfied with criticizing various government follies,
although one might have to begin with this, but one must always proceed from
there to a fundamental attack on the institution of the state as a moral
outrage and its representatives as moral as well as economic frauds, liars,
and impostors – as emperors without clothes.

In particular, one must never hesitate to strike at the very heart of the
legitimacy of the state: its alleged indispensable role as producer of
private protection and security. I have already shown how ridiculous this
claim is on theoretical grounds: how can an agency that may expropriate
private property possibly claim to be a protector of private property? But
hardly less important is it to attack the legitimacy of the state in this
regard on empirical grounds. That is, to point out and hammer away on the
subject that, after all, states, which are supposed to protect us, are the
very institution responsible for an estimated 170 million death in the
twentieth century alone – more than the victims of private crime in all of
human history (and this number of victims of private crimes, from which
government did not protect us, would have been even much lower if
governments everywhere and at all times had not undertaken constant efforts
of disarming its own citizens so that the governments in turn would become
ever more effective killing machines)!

Instead of treating politicians with respect, then, one’s criticism of them
should be significantly stepped up: almost to a man, they are not only
thieves but mass murderers. How dare they demand our respect and loyalty.

But will a sharp and distinct ideological radicalization bring the results
aimed at? I have no doubt. Indeed, only radical – and in fact radically
simple – ideas can possibly stir the emotions of the dull and indolent
masses and delegitimate government in their eyes.

Let me quote Hayek to this effect (and in doing so, I hope to indicate also
that my rather harsh earlier criticism of him should not be misunderstood as
implying that one cannot learn anything from authors who are fundamentally
wrong and muddled):

"We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual
adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia, a programme
which seems neither a mere defence of things as they are nor a diluted kind
of socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the
susceptibilities of the mighty..., which is not too severely practical and
which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible.
We need intellectual leaders who are prepared to resist the blandishments of
power and influence and who are willing to work for an ideal, however small
may be the prospects of its early realization. They must be men who are
willing to stick to principles and to fight for their full realization,
however remote. Free trade and freedom of opportunity are ideas which still
may arouse the imaginations of large numbers, but a mere ‘reasonable
freedom of trade’ or a mere ‘relaxation of controls’ is neither
intellectually respectable nor likely to inspire any enthusiasm....

"Unless we can make the philosophical foundations of a free society once
more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task which
challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the
prospects of freedom are indeed dark. But if we can regain that belief in
the power of ideas which was the mark of liberalism at its best, the battle
is not lost."

Hayek of course did not heed his own advice and provide us with a consistent
and inspiring theory. His Utopia, as developed in his Constitution of
Liberty, is the rather uninspiring vision of the Swedish welfare state.
Instead, it is Rothbard who has done what Hayek recognized as necessary for
a renewal of classical liberalism; and if there is anything that can reverse
the seemingly unstoppable tide of statism and restore justice and liberty,
it is the personal example set by Murray Rothbard and the spread of
Rothbardianism.

May 20, 2002

Hans-Hermann Hoppe [send him mail], whom Lew Rockwell calls "an
international treasure," is senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute,
professor of economics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and editor of
The Journal of Libertarian Studies. Democracy: The God That Failed is his
eighth book. Visit his website. This essay is based on Professor Hoppe’s
Murray N. Rothbard Memorial Lecture at the Mises Institute’s Austrian
Scholars Conference in 1999.

Copyright 2002 by LewRockwell.com

Hans-Hermann Hoppe Archives


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