Title: Asia Times: US dollar hegemony has got to go
The US
has proven that it cannot print money at will without creating ruinous
inflation, which has been corrected over a period of the last 20 yrs.
Today's strong $ is evidence of the correction of inflationary policies which
once led currency traders to say "the long term direction of the $ is
down," and that time was a wonderful source of trading profits in foreign
currencies for traders around the world.
The
experience of Germany shows that any country desiring a strong currency can
have one if they put their mind to it, and it can be seen how progress is
compromised. Japan and England offer further evidence of what must be
done. Are there any secrets?
The
dirty little secret of "$ hegemony" is that the US is a little less stupid
than the alternatives. If the alternatives got their act together,
the race would be on again for the stronger currency, with all its proven
benefits, which would be won by the country with the better policies,
particularly one of the larger countries. The benefits to All would be
enormous, as the US would shape up. Why they have waited so long is
the most interesting question, which everyone seems chary to
discuss.
A
group of Soviet economists yrs ago were touring a US supermarket, and they
all stopped at the section for canned beans. They were said to have asked
their Amer hosts why there were so many different bean packagers, when one
larger producer would be so much cheaper. An Amer host is said to have
answered, "This bean makes the other bean better."
Do you
believe it? Best regards,
Dean
-----Original Message----- From: Henry C.K. Liu
[mailto:hliu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 6:08
AM To: pkt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; gang8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx;
TheNewForum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; a-list@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject:
[TNF] Asia Times: US dollar hegemony has got to go
April 11,
2002
atimes.com
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Global Economy
US dollar hegemony has got to go By
Henry C K Liu
There is an economics-textbook myth that
foreign-exchange rates are determined by supply and demand based on
market fundamentals. Economics tends to dismiss socio-political factors
that shape market fundamentals that affect supply and demand.
The current international finance architecture is based on the
US dollar as the dominant reserve currency, which now accounts for 68
percent of global currency reserves, up from 51 percent a decade ago.
Yet in 2000, the US share of global exports (US$781.1 billon out of a
world total of $6.2 trillion) was only 12.3 percent and its share of
global imports ($1.257 trillion out of a world total of $6.65 trillion)
was 18.9 percent. World merchandise exports per capita amounted to
$1,094 in 2000, while 30 percent of the world's population lived on less
than $1 a day, about one-third of per capita export value.
Ever
since 1971, when US president Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold
standard (at $35 per ounce) that had been agreed to at the Bretton Woods
Conference at the end of World War II, the dollar has been a global
monetary instrument that the United States, and only the United States,
can produce by fiat. The dollar, now a fiat currency, is at a 16-year
trade-weighted high despite record US current-account deficits and the
status of the US as the leading debtor nation. The US national debt as
of April 4 was $6.021 trillion against a gross domestic product (GDP) of
$9 trillion.
World trade is now a game in which the US produces
dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy.
The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a
comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars
to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar
reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies. To
prevent speculative and manipulative attacks on their currencies, the
world's central banks must acquire and hold dollar reserves in
corresponding amounts to their currencies in circulation. The higher the
market pressure to devalue a particular currency, the more dollar
reserves its central bank must hold. This creates a built-in support for
a strong dollar that in turn forces the world's central banks to acquire
and hold more dollar reserves, making it stronger. This phenomenon is
known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically
constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are
denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy
oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the US has extracted
from oil-producing countries for US tolerance of the oil-exporting
cartel since 1973.
By definition, dollar reserves must be
invested in US assets, creating a capital-accounts surplus for the US
economy. Even after a year of sharp correction, US stock valuation is
still at a 25-year high and trading at a 56 percent premium compared
with emerging markets.
The Quantity Theory of Money is clearly
at work. US assets are not growing at a pace on par with the growth of
the quantity of dollars. US companies still respresent 56 percent of
global market capitalization despite recent retrenchment in which entire
sectors suffered some 80 percent a fall in value. The cumulative return
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) from 1990 through 2001 was
281 percent, while the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
developed-country index posted a return of only 12.4 percent even
without counting Japan. The MSCI emerging-market index posted a mere 7.7
percent return. The US capital-account surplus in turn finances the US
trade deficit. Moreover, any asset, regardless of location, that is
denominated in dollars is a US asset in essence. When oil is denominated
in dollars through US state action and the dollar is a fiat currency,
the US essentially owns the world's oil for free. And the more the US
prints greenbacks, the higher the price of US assets will rise. Thus a
strong-dollar policy gives the US a double win.
Historically,
the processes of globalization has always been the result of state
action, as opposed to the mere surrender of state sovereignty to market
forces. Currency monopoly of course is the most fundamental trade
restraint by one single government. Adam Smith published Wealth of
Nations in 1776, the year of US independence. By the time the
constitution was framed 11 years later, the US founding fathers were
deeply influenced by Smith's ideas, which constituted a reasoned
abhorrence of trade monopoly and government policy in restricting trade.
What Smith abhorred most was a policy known as mercantilism, which was
practiced by all the major powers of the time. It is necessary to bear
in mind that Smith's notion of the limitation of government action was
exclusively related to mercantilist issues of trade restraint. Smith
never advocated government tolerance of trade restraint, whether by big
business monopolies or by other governments.
A central aim of
mercantilism was to ensure that a nation's exports remained higher in
value than its imports, the surplus in that era being paid only in
specie money (gold-backed as opposed to fiat money). This trade surplus
in gold permitted the surplus country, such as England, to invest in
more factories to manufacture more for export, thus bringing home more
gold. The importing regions, such as the American colonies, not only
found the gold reserves backing their currency depleted, causing
free-fall devaluation (not unlike that faced today by many
emerging-economy currencies), but also wanting in surplus capital for
building factories to produce for export. So despite plentiful iron ore
in America, only pig iron was exported to England in return for English
finished iron goods.
In 1795, when the Americans began finally
to wake up to their disadvantaged trade relationship and began to raise
European (mostly French and Dutch) capital to start a manufacturing
industry, England decreed the Iron Act, forbidding the manufacture of
iron goods in America, which caused great dissatisfaction among the
prospering colonials. Smith favored an opposite government policy toward
promoting domestic economic production and free foreign trade, a policy
that came to be known as "laissez faire" (because the English, having
nothing to do with such heretical ideas, refuse to give it an English
name). Laissez faire, notwithstanding its literal meaning of "leave
alone", meant nothing of the sort. It meant an activist government
policy to counteract mercantilism. Neo-liberal free-market economists
are just bad historians, among their other defective characteristics,
when they propagandize "laissez faire" as no government interference in
trade affairs.
A strong-dollar policy is in the US national
interest because it keeps US inflation low through low-cost imports and
it makes US assets expensive for foreign investors. This arrangement,
which Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan proudly calls US
financial hegemony in congressional testimony, has kept the US economy
booming in the face of recurrent financial crises in the rest of the
world. It has distorted globalization into a "race to the bottom"
process of exploiting the lowest labor costs and the highest
environmental abuse worldwide to produce items and produce for export to
US markets in a quest for the almighty dollar, which has not been backed
by gold since 1971, nor by economic fundamentals for more than a decade.
The adverse effect of this type of globalization on the developing
economies are obvious. It robs them of the meager fruits of their
exports and keeps their domestic economies starved for capital, as all
surplus dollars must be reinvested in US treasuries to prevent the
collapse of their own domestic currencies.
The adverse effect of
this type of globalization on the US economy is also becoming clear. In
order to act as consumer of last resort for the whole world, the US
economy has been pushed into a debt bubble that thrives on conspicuous
consumption and fraudulent accounting. The unsustainable and irrational
rise of US equity prices, unsupported by revenue or profit, had merely
been a devaluation of the dollar. Ironically, the current fall in US
equity prices reflects a trend to an even stronger dollar, as it can buy
more deflated shares.
The world economy, through technological
progress and non-regulated markets, has entered a stage of overcapacity
in which the management of aggregate demand is the obvious solution. Yet
we have a situation in which the people producing the goods cannot
afford to buy them and the people receiving the profit from goods
production cannot consume more of these goods. The size of the US
market, large as it is, is insufficient to absorb the continuous growth
of the world's new productive power. For the world economy to grow, the
whole population of the world needs to be allowed to participate with
its fair share of consumption. Yet economic and monetary policy makers
continue to view full employment and rising fair wages as the direct
cause of inflation, which is deemed a threat to sound money.
The
Keynesian starting point is that full employment is the basis of good
economics. It is through full employment at fair wages that all other
economic inefficiencies can best be handled, through an accommodating
monetary policy. Say's Law (supply creates its own demand) turns this
principle upside down with its bias toward supply/production.
Monetarists in support of Say's Law thus develop a phobia against
inflation, claiming unemployment to be a necessary tool for fighting
inflation and that in the long run, sound money produces the highest
possible employment level. They call that level a "natural" rate of
unemployment, the technical term being NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment).
It is hard to see how sound money can
ever lead to full employment when unemployment is necessary to maintain
sound money. Within limits and within reason, unemployment hurts people
and inflation hurts money. And if money exists to serve people, then the
choice becomes obvious. Without global full employment, the theory of
comparative advantage in world trade is merely Say's Law
internationalized.
No single economy can profit for long at the
expense of the rest of an interdependent world. There is an urgent need
to restructure the global finance architecture to return to exchange
rates based on purchasing-power parity, and to reorient the world
trading system toward true comparative advantage based on global full
employment with rising wages and living standards. The key starting
point is to focus on the hegemony of the dollar.
To save the
world from the path of impending disaster, we must:
promote an awareness among policy makers globally that excessive
dependence on exports merely to service dollar debt is self-destructive
to any economy;
promote a new global finance architecture away from a dollar
hegemony that forces the world to export not only goods but also dollar
earnings from trade to the US;
promote the application of the State Theory of Money (which asserts
that the value of money is ultimately backed by a government's authority
to levy taxes) to provide needed domestic credit for sound economic
development and to free developing economies from the tyranny of
dependence on foreign capital;
restructure international economic relations toward aggregate demand
management away from the current overemphasis on predatory supply
expansion through redundant competition; and
restructure world trade toward true comparative advantage in the
context of global full employment and global wage and environmental
standards.
This is easier done than imagained. The starting
point is for the major exporting nations each to unilaterally require
that all its exports be payable only in its currency, so that the global
finance architecture will turn into a multi-currency regime overnight.
There would be no need for reserve currencies and exchange rates would
reflect market fundamentals of world trade.
As for aggregate
demand management, Asia leads the world in both overcapacity and
underconsumption. It is high time for Asia to realize the potential of
its market power. If the people of Asia are to be compensated fairly for
their labor, the global economy will see its fastest growth ever.
Henry C K Liu is chairman of the New York-based Liu
Investment Group.
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