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[A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues
- To: "A-List (E-mail)" <a-list@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues
- From: "Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 15:37:17 +0200
- Thread-index: AcHRprc+yHlOKD1xEdaZBQAQWtb4aQ==
- Thread-topic: Afghanistan: the blowback continues
Operation Anaconda: Win-win, lose-lose
By Mushahid Hussain
Asia Times, March 22, 2002
ISLAMABAD - The results of the just-ended 16-day Operation Anaconda, the
biggest and most important military engagement of US forces in
Afghanistan, are richer in statistics than in substance.
Eight US fatalities, two MH-47 Chinook helicopters disabled, and no
"enemy" soldiers captured since they adamantly refused to surrender were
among some of the supposed achievements of the mission when it concluded
this month. But notwithstanding the claim of killing "hundreds of
al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters", there was no word that the elusive "VIP
fugitives" Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar were among them.
A week into the campaign, on March 8, US President George W Bush
grudgingly admitted, "These people evidently don't want to give up. And
that's okay, if that's their attitude, we'll just have to adjust, and
they'll have made a mistake." At the conclusion of the campaign, the
comments of General Tommy Franks, the commander-in-chief of the US
Central Command, which oversees the Afghan theater of operations, were
apt. He termed the security situation in Afghanistan "murky and
troublesome".
Operation Anaconda involved about 1,000 US troops, including Special
Forces, 200 commandos from allies including Canada and Australia, and a
couple of thousand Afghan forces, including a thousand-man detachment of
the Afghan interim government. It took place 50 kilometers from the
Pakistani border, and the fighting was 150km south of Kabul, with
anonymous "US officials" telling the Associated Press last Saturday that
"numerous al-Qaeda fighters fleeing the battles are believed to have
escaped into Pakistan".
Given this context, it is no accident that soon after distributing
medals for bravery in action to US soldiers in Afghanistan and formally
proclaiming the end of Operation Anaconda, Franks flew into Pakistan for
an unscheduled visit on Sunday. Presumably the purpose of his journey
was to seek President General Pervez Musharraf's continued cooperation
in mopping up the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, should any have
escaped the Pakistan Army's dragnet and managed to enter Pakistan
covertly.
The daunting task that lies ahead was made more evident on the very day
of Franks' arrival, which saw a major act of terrorism directed against
a church congregation in Islamabad's diplomatic enclave, just 365 meters
from the US Embassy. The attack last weekend resulted in five
fatalities, including the wife and daughter of an American diplomat.
That the attackers managed to strike so close to the embassy, one of the
country's most guarded installations in ostensibly Pakistan's most
secure city, is an indication of the gravity of the threat posed by the
fallout of the Afghan War on both the Americans and the Musharraf
military regime.
In fact, within the past month, there has been a "hat trick of terror"
in terms of the timing of striking at sensitive targets.
On February 21, American journalist Daniel Pearl's macabre videotaped
murder was announced soon after Musharraf's US visit. On February 26,
worshippers at a mosque were gunned down in the vicinity of the Pakistan
Army's General Headquarters (GHQ), and then came last Sunday's attack on
the heavily guarded church near the citadel of symbolism and power, the
US Embassy in Islamabad.
Given that the security situation remains "murky and troublesome", as
Franks put it, what are the larger lessons to be drawn from Operation
Anaconda? Three are particularly relevant.
First, an insight into the historical context of America's Asian
military adventures is necessary. At the height of the Vietnam War in
1968, the Viet Cong launched the "Tet Offensive" coinciding with the
Vietnamese New Year, which the United States won militarily but lost
politically over the longer term. It was then that an American general
made his famous comment on how to exit from Vietnam: "We should simply
declare we have won and just get the hell out of Vietnam." Now, a
similar refrain, albeit on a smaller scale, is being felt in
Afghanistan, given the resilience of the resistance, which refuses to
surrender, and the failure to capture or kill either bin Laden or Mullah
Omar. The interview on Monday of Osama's half-brother, Sheikh Ahmad, who
told CNN that his brother is "alive and well", is certain to throw
another spanner into the works of the US game plan.
Second, as Israel is discovering in dealing with the Palestinians or as
the United States did in Vietnam, military might alone is not enough to
defeat a determined enemy even if it is dispersed. Politically, the
extended use of force can be counterproductive. This what the United
States is discovering in Afghanistan, since there are Afghan sources who
dispute claims that "only al-Qaeda is being targeted" and say there are
recurring reports of civilians also being killed by US bombing.
Third, if the United States gets bogged down in Afghanistan, the entire
capacity of Washington to expand its war on terrorism, for instance to
Iraq, will be called into question.
The results of Operation Anaconda, which was declared a "victory" by the
US, was followed by a day later by another attack on US bases and Afghan
allied forces on Wednesday in Khost in eastern Afghanistan, a stark
reminder of the limitations of US military power. These limitations also
adversely affect US political and diplomatic clout, as evidenced in the
conclusion of Operation Anaconda, which coincided with the end of Vice
President Dick Cheney's 10-day Middle East journey, a trip that resulted
in virtually unanimous opposition to any military action against Iraq.
Thus, more second thoughts are bound to emerge as to the direction of
both the American war in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism.
Full article at:
http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DC22Ag01.html
Michael Keaney
Mercuria Business School
Martinlaaksontie 36
01620 Vantaa
Finland
michael.keaney@xxxxxx
- Thread context:
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues, (continued)
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Tue 19 Mar 2002, 09:12 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Wed 20 Mar 2002, 06:35 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Wed 20 Mar 2002, 12:44 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Fri 22 Mar 2002, 13:35 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Fri 22 Mar 2002, 13:38 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Mon 25 Mar 2002, 13:58 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Mon 25 Mar 2002, 16:29 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Wed 03 Apr 2002, 08:24 GMT
- [A-List] Afghanistan: the blowback continues,
Keaney Michael Wed 03 Apr 2002, 09:03 GMT
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