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[A-List] UK sub-imperialism
- To: "A-List (E-mail)" <a-list@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [A-List] UK sub-imperialism
- From: "Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 14:40:46 +0200
- Thread-index: AcG6C8xf0uHaHiXqEdaZBQAQWtb4aQ==
- Thread-topic: UK sub-imperialism
Here's an authoritative source backing Jack Straw's efforts to
legitimise the use of private mercenaries in overseas military
adventures. A related theme that would be good to develop would be just
exactly what does the RAND Corporation do? Some international relations
theorists are getting quite excited about the apparently new emergence
of "non-state actors" in world political economy, but this outfit has
been plying its trade for quite some time now and appears to retain some
kind of significance. Listers with knowledge of and information about
RAND are welcome to develop a separate thread on this organisation and
its activities.
Leash the dogs of war
Private military companies can play a positive role in the developing
world - but regulation is essential, says Kevin O'Brien
Financial Times, February 20 2002
Private military companies are, in some ways, the modern-day equivalent
of the colonial exploration companies that, in the name of empires, went
out into the world and colonised vast parts of the globe. They are often
compared with the mercenaries of the 1960s, the demobilised and
disgruntled western soldiers who fought for all sides in the chaos of
decolonisation. But to tar mercenaries and today's private soldiers with
the same brush misses the point.
Much of the attention now focuses on the role of private military
companies in the developing world; part of this stems from a renewed
interest in mercenarism, last seen during the mid-1970s, and part is
related to the perception of private security companies as a new
phenomenon in regional security. The furore surrounding the 1998
arms-to-Africa affair, when a private military company run by a former
British army officer supplied weapons to Sierra Leone despite a United
Nations arms embargo, is but one demonstration of the sensationalism
that this subject attracts.
But the fact is that for decades private military companies have
operated with the tacit or explicit approval of their western
governments. As long ago as the Vietnam war, the company Vinnell was
used extensively; today, companies such as MPRI, Betac, SAIC, AirScan
and many others are contracted by the US government to provide defence
and security services for overseas operations.
Much the same can be said of British companies such as Defence Systems,
which provided bodyguards for Diana, Princess of Wales, during her
visits to landmine victims in Angola. With a reputation for
professionalism, integrity and good business, DSL was hired throughout
the 1980s and into the 1990s by international organisations such as the
World Bank, the United Nations and various aid organisations.
To take another example, in October 1998 the US government subcontracted
its involvement in the Kosovo monitoring force to DynCorp. The
contracting was done because the US government did not want to send its
trained military personnel into harm's way unarmed, as the monitors are;
it also ensured that the US government did not have to undergo the
political risk associated with sending soldiers into situations that are
little understood or supported domestically.
There will always be concern over private military companies'
relationships with oil and mining companies operating in some of the
more lawless parts of the developing world - and over their
often-perceived role as covert proxies for western governments. But they
are increasingly being used to provide security and related assistance
to humanitarian and aid organisations operating in regions of conflict.
They can bring stability - albeit temporary and in need of follow-up
from the international community - to conflicts in the developing world,
as well as providing non-combatant services (such as mine-clearance,
medical and welfare services, infrastructure and repair and
child-combatant repatriation services) and helping to develop
professional armed forces - a contribution towards domestic stability
and security that should not be under-estimated.
The way forward is clear: effective regulation, at both national and
international levels, is the key. The proposals that were announced this
week in the UK government's green paper highlight the need for this both
to "set guidelines for the industry [to give companies] an indication of
what was and was not expected of them by the government" and to "help
establish a respectable and therefore more employable industry".
Jack Straw, the UK foreign secretary, is said to prefer regulation based
on licensing; however, this is not stringent enough to ensure full
transparency.
By introducing legislation that differentiates between mercenarism and
private military activity - generally through labelling the activity and
not the actor - the industry can be rendered more transparent. South
Africa's 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act is, for all
its faults and limitations, a strong example to build on in the UK. The
South African legislation regulates both the existence of the companies
(by forcing them to be licensed even to operate) and their operations
(by making them seek licensed approval for each contract undertaken).
The aim is to ensure that the companies are monitored after they have
been authorised, as well as ensuring that they are individually licensed
for the types of services they wish to provide.
At the same time, the UK should push for a new definition of the
problematic 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing and Training of Mercenaries (in force since October 2001), so
that the activities are defined, rather than the actors. Until this is
done, not only will the International Convention remain virtually
unenforceable but national legislation will remain only moderately
effective.
The writer is a senior policy analyst with RAND Europe
Michael Keaney
Mercuria Business School
Martinlaaksontie 36
01620 Vantaa
Finland
michael.keaney@xxxxxx
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