[A-List] footnotes to Domrin paper on Russia

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1
Aknowledgment: The author wishes to thank Alexei Lyubimov of the State Duma 
Law Department and Natalia Myakova of the Russian Parliamentary Library for 
their support with materials for this article.
2  Polit.ru, 28 June 2001.  Probably in the context of the forthcoming 
discussion of civil society development in Russia, a day before the meeting 
with the President, envoy Latyshev told Moscow reporters about his new 
initiative to start TV broadcasting of the judicial proceedings against 
corrupt officials as a form of combating official corruption (Polit.ru, 27 
June 2001; Interfax, 27 June 2001).
3  Polit.ru, 12 July 2001.
4  For further research in the Russian non-governmental sector see a number 
of useful websites:  www.ngo.ru (Catalog of Social Resources on Internet); 
www.trainet.org (Virtual Resource Center for NGOs); www.hrights.ru (Human 
Rights Institute); www.hro.org (Human Rights Online); infohome.dcn-asu.ru 
and infohome.alt.ru (InfoHouse-Altai); www.cip.nsk.su (Inter-regional 
Public Foundation Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center); www.hartia.ru 
(Information and Discussion Portal of Civil Society in Russia).  Views of 
Russian special services on civil society are quite adequaltely represented 
in: «Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i ego vragi» [Civil Society and Its Enemies]. 
An Interview with Sergei Goncharov, Spetsnaz Rossii, No. 10 (61), 20 
October 2001; also available at 
http://www.specnaz.ru:8101/gazeta/10_2001/3.htm.
5  Interfax, 4 September 2001 (quoting Evgeni Vodopyanov, the vice 
president of the Union of Charitable Organizations of Russia).
6  See «Good Works», The Economist, 24 March 2001, p. 61-62.
7  On 12 June 1990, the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted the 
Declaration of State Sovereignty proclaiming the «supremacy» of Russian 
Constitution and Russian laws «throughout the territory of the RSFSR», 
suspending «the effect of acts of the USSR which are contrary to the 
sovereign rights of the RSFSR» (Art. 5), and declaring the necessity of 
concluding a new Union Treaty (Art. 6, 15).  According to an objective 
assessment of F.J.M. Feldbrugge, a leading European expert in Russian law, 
together with the subsequently adopted Russian laws of October 24, 1990 «On 
the Effect of Acts of USSR Agencies on the Territory of the RSFSR» 
(establishing that the Union possessed only such powers as had been handed 
over by the Union republics, and granting the Russian Supreme Soviet or 
Council of Ministers the «right to suspend the operation» of Union acts «if 
they violate the sovereignty of the Russian Federation»), and of October 
31, 1990 «On Safeguarding the Economic Foundation of the Sovereignty of the 
RSFSR» (proclaiming that «the land, its minerals, ... airspace, waters, 
forests, flora and fauna, and other natural and raw material resources 
located on the territory of the RSFSR, the resources of the continental 
shelf and maritime economic zone of the RSFSR,... and artistic and cultural 
valuables shall be the national wealth of the peoples of the RSFSR», and 
declaring that the assets of all «state enterprises, institutions, 
organizations, and agencies» on the RSFSR territory are Russian state 
property), the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia «virtually robbed 
the USSR of its assets on RSFSR territory... Pulled the rug from underneath 
of the USSR»  (F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Russian Law: the End of the Soviet System 
and the Role of Law (Series «Law in Eastern Europe», No. 45. Dordrecht, 
Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), p. 140). On 12 June 
1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected the first President of Russia.
8  A complete list of participants in the meeting with President Putin and 
more information on the forthcoming Civic Forum are available at the 
Forum's website at  www.civilforum.ru.
9  That's indicative that after years of strong hopes (on the verge of 
wishful thinking) that «Russia's revolution has by no means ended» (at 
least three times literally repeated in: «Forget About Monica, It's Moscow 
and the Stakes are Global», Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1998; «Russia's 
Crisis. Will Russia Survive Its Economic and Political Crisis?», PBS Online 
Newshour, 17 September 1998 (reproduced on Johnson's Russia List, #2387, 20 
September 1998); «A Russia Still Redeemable», Washington Post, 21 September 
1998) or that «Russia is midstream in a social revolution» («Russia's 
Revolution Is Not Over», Christian Science Monitor, 20 September 1999) 
Michael McFaul finally accepted the inevitable and called his book Russia's 
Unfinished Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
10  The report was later published as: Alexander Domrin, «Issues and 
Options in the Soviet Transition to the Rule of Law», 30 Coexistence. A 
Review of East-West and Development Issues (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
Dordrecht, Boston, London) 1 (March 1993).
11  Catastrophic consequences of perestroika were recognized by the most of 
Western scholars already in 1992-93.  See, for instance:  John Blaney, Mike 
Gfoeller, «Lessons from the Failure of Perestroika», 108 Political Science 
Quarterly 3 (Autumn, 1993); James Clay Moltz, «Divergent Learning and the 
Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform», 45 World Politics 2 (January 1993).
12  This observation applies not only to Russia and other former Soviet 
republics.  In some other areas of the world the use of the «civil society» 
formula often lacks any legal meaning and serves as an element of a 
pseudo-legal justification for purely political goals.  That is quite 
indicative that even ethnic Albanian terrorists and separatists in 
Macedonia demand recognition of the Albanian language as the second 
official language of the republic under a pretext of the necessity to 
«secure the adequate development of a civil society» and to «secure the 
full integration of all citizens of Macedonia into the civil society». 
(Vecer, 12 July 2001. Quoted in: Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, «Macedonia: 
Speaking a Different Language», RFE/RL Newsline, 26 July 2001).
13  Plan zakonodatelnikh rabot po tematike «Grazhdanskoe obschestvo» [The 
State Duma's Plan of «Civil Society» Legislative Drafting] and 
Rekomendatsii parlamentskikh slushaniy «Rossiysky federalizm i problemy 
razvitiya grazhdanskogo obschestva [Recommendations of Parliamentary 
Hearings on Russian Federalism and Problems of Development of Civil 
Society] are available in the Parliamentary Library under indexes: 
??/?M2-3/c?/95-84 and ??/?M2-3/c?/99-552 (respectively).
14  Aleksander Smolar, «Civil Society After Communism: From Opposition to 
Atomization», 7 Journal of Democracy 1 (January 1996), p. 24. Compare to 
the following observations: «With all the fuss and noise not a single new 
idea has come our of Eastern Europe in 1989» (French historian Francois 
Furet); «a peculiar characteristic of this revolution, namely its total 
lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future» 
(Jurgen Habermas) (quoted in: Mary H. Kaldor, «The Ideas of 1989: The 
Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society», 9 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems (Fall 1999), p. 475.
15  Aleksander Smolar, op.cit., p. 24.
16  See, for instance, Devyatnadsataya Vsesoyuznaya Konferentsiya KPSS: 
dokumenty i materialy [The Nineteenth All-Union Conference of the CPSU: 
Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988).
17  It was already in 1993, when Peter Stavrakis, at that time Associate 
Director of the Kennan Institute, came to a conclusion that «Bolshevist 
monetarism adapted quite comfortably to the historical terrain of Soviet 
experience, as the Gaidar team exhibited the same ideological fervor that 
had motivated its Leninist precursors».  (Peter Stavrakis, State Building 
in Post-Soviet Russia: The Chicago Boys and the Decline of Administrative 
Capacity (Washington: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 
Occasional Paper # 254. August, October 1993), p. 56).  The term 
«Bolshevist monetarism» was later transformed into another adequate 
version: «market Bolshevism». (See, for instance: Peter Reddaway & Dmitri 
Glinski, Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy 
(Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001)).
18  See K Rossii edinoy, sil'noy, demokraticheskoy, protsvetayuschey. 
Politicheskaya programma Grazhdanskogo soyuza [Towards Russia United, 
Strong, Democratic, Prosperous. Political Program of the Civic Union] 
(Moscow: Civic Union, 1992. V.P. Averchev, A.N. Domrin, A.V. Lukin, etc. 
Alexander Lukin, ed.)
19  See, for instance, Aleksander Smolar, op.cit., p. 24.
20  Bronislaw Geremek, «Problems of Postcommunism: Civil Society Then and 
Now», 3 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 1992), p. 12; Larry Diamond, 
«Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation», 5 Journal of 
Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 5).
21  Decree No. 354 of April 3, 1992 «On the Secretary of State of the 
Russian Federation», Decree No. 673 of July 6, 1995 «On Drafting the 
Concept of Legal Reform in the Russian Federation», Decree No. 424 of March 
27, 1996 «On Certain Measures Aimed at Strengthening State Support to 
Science and Institutions of Higher Education in the Russian Federation», 
Decree No. 440 of April 1, 1996 «On the Concept of Transition of the 
Russian Federation to Sustainable Development», Decree No. 803 of June 3, 
1996 «On Basic Provisions of Regional Policy in the Russian Federation», 
Decree No. 864 of June 13, 1996 «On Certain Measures of the State Support 
to Human Rights Movement in the Russian Federation», Decree No. 909 of June 
15, 1996 «On Approval of the Concept of State National Policy of the 
Russian Federation», Decree No. 1300 of December 17, 1997 «On Approval of 
the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation», Decree No. 1370 
of October 15, 1999 «On Approval of Basic Provisions of the State Policy in 
the Sphere of Development of Local Self-Government in the Russian 
Federation», and Decree No. 24 of January 10, 2000 «On the National 
Security Concept of the Russian Federation».
22  No. 360-?? of July 14, 1992 «On Ensuring the Activities of the Research 
Center of Private Law», and No. 589-?? of December 18, 1996 «On Support to 
«People's House» Public Institutions».
23  Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet No.1801-1 of October 24, 1991 
«On the Concept of the RF Judicial System», and resolutions of the State 
Duma No. 450-1 ?? of January 13, 1995 «On a Tentative Program of 
Legislation-Making» of the State Duma in 1995, and No. 359-II ?? of May 17, 
1996 «On Holding Elections of the RF President in Constitutionally Defined 
Terms».
24  Respectively, No. 7-? of April 30, 1997; No. 14-? of November 22, 
2000,  and No. ??-?40/2488-01 of May 22, 2001.
25  The federal programs were respectively adopted at a session of the RF 
Government on August 6, 1993 (a month and a half before Yeltsin's coup 
d'etat in Russia), by Resolution of the RF Government No. 1005 of October 
12, 1995, and by Resolution of the RF Government No. 955 of December 14, 2000.
26  No. 939 of September 19, 1995; No. 327 of March 23, 1996; and No. 547 
of May 1, 1996.
27  Also see: Stanovleniye institutov grazhdanskogo obschestva [Evolution 
of Civil Society Institutions. Materials of interregional scientific and 
practical conference «Evolution of Civil Society Institutions in Saratov 
Oblast (1989-1999)», 20-21 January 2000 (Saratov: Government of Saratov 
Oblast, Povolzhye Academy of Civil Service, 2000. V.N. Yuzhakov, ed.)
28  See, for instance, Resolution No. 392 of May 4, 1999 «On the Concept of 
Moscow Program of Social Development», and Resolution No. 87-?? of January 
23, 2001 «On the Complex Program of Development and Support of Small 
Business in Moscow in 2001-2003».
29  More on the 1999 address of President of Bashkortostan see, for 
instance: A. Makhmutov, «Sem' kluchevikh problem Poslaniya-99 Prezidenta 
Respubliki Bashkortostan Gosudarstvennomu Sobraniyu» [Seven Key Problems of 
the 1999 Address of President of Bashkortostan to the State Assembly], 
Ekonomika i upravleniye, No. 3, 1999. P. 3-7.
30  See, for instance, decision of the head of administration of Astrakhan 
Oblast No. 598-p of May 31, 2001 «On Organization of a Scientific-Practical 
Conference 'Civil Society to Children of Russia'» or Resolution of Mayor of 
Tomsk No. 141 of March 15, 2001 «On Organization of Electoral Action 'The 
19th Wave' Held by the Tomsk Branch of 'Civil Society and Elections' on 
March 19, 2001».
31  See Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 July 2000.
32  The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation was 
approved by the RF President on September 9, 2000.
33  The letters and resolution were issued in 1997-2000 and defined such 
questions as a mandatory minimum of curricula in general schools, etc.
34  Slovar'-spravochnik po rossiyskomu zakonodatel'stvu: terminy, 
ponyatiya, opredeleniya [A Dictionary & Manual of Russian Legislation: 
Terms, Concepts, Definitions] (Moscow: Yuridicheskiy dom «Justitsinform», 
1998. Compiled by L.F. Apt, A.I. Vetrov, etc.)
35 See, for instance: Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Kommentariy 
[Constitution of the Russian Federation. Commentary] (Moscow: 
Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1994. B.N. Topornin, etc., eds. 624 p.); 
Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Problemniy kommentariy [Constitution 
of the Russian Federation. A Problematic Commentary] (Moscow: Tsentr 
konstitutsionnikh issledovaniy MONF, 1997. V.A. Chetvernin, ed. 702 p.).
36  More on philosophic origins of the concept of civil society see: 
G.F.Slesareva, «Grazhdanskoe obschestvo v istorii politicheskoy mysli 
Evropy (on antichnosti do pervoy treti XIX veka)» [Civil Society in History 
of Political Thought of Europe (from Ancient Times to the First Third of 
the 19th Century], Mezhdunarodniy istorichesky zhurnal, No. 10, July-August 
2000; Yu.M. Reznik, Grazhdanskoe obschestvo kak fenomen civilizatsii. 
Chast' 1. Ideya grazhdanskogo obschestva v sotsial'noy misli [Civil Society 
as a Phenomenon of Civilization. Part 1. Civil Society in Social Sciences] 
(Moscow: Soyuz, 1993. 167 p.); V.V. Vityuk, Stanovlenie ideyi grazhdanskogo 
obschestva i eyo istoricheskaya evolutsiya [Emergence of the Civil Society 
Concept and Its Historic Evolution] (Moscow, 1995. 91 p.).
37  See, for instance: Alison Brysk, «Democratizing Civil Society in Latin 
America», July 2000; Joao Carlos Espada, «Liberalism of Sorts. Review of 
After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society, by Ralf Dahrendorf», 
October 1998; Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, «The Paradox of Civil 
Society», July 1996; William A. Galston, «Civil Society and the 'Art of 
Association'», January 2000; Thomas B. Gold, «Tiananmen and Beyond: The 
Resurgence of Civil Society in China», Winter 1990;  E. Gyimah-Boadi, 
«Civil Society in Africa», April 1996; Iliya Harik, «Rethinking Civil 
Society: Pluralism in the Arab World», July 1994; Wilmot James and Daria 
Caliguire, «The New South Africa: Renewing Civil Society», January 1996, 
Aymen M. Khalifa, «Reviving Civil Society in Egypt», July 1995; Laith 
Kubba, «Arabs and Democracy: The Awakening of Civil Society», July 2000; 
Peter M. Lewis, «'Civil' and Other Societies. Review of Civil Society and 
the State in Africa, edited by John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and 
Naomi Chazan», April 1995; Marc F. Plattner, «The Uses of 'Civil Society'. 
Review of Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, by Ernest 
Gellner», October 1995.
38  See Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (Springfield, Mass.: 
Merriam-Webster, 1996. xx, 634 p.); Ballentine's Law Dictionary, with 
Pronunciations. [By] James A. Ballantine [1871-1949] / 3d ed., edited by 
William S. Anderson (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Pub. Co, 1969. 
ix, 1429 p.); Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage (By David 
Mellinkoff. St Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1992. x, 703 p.);  Brian A. 
Garner's A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2nd ed. New York : Oxford 
University Press, 1995. xxvi, 953 p.); Burton's Legal Thesaurus (By William 
C. Burton. 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan Library Reference, 1998. xix, 1212 
p.); Words & Phrases. Permanent Edition. 1658 to Date (St. Paul, Minn.: 
West Publ. Go., 1964);  Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. / Bryan A. Garner, 
editor in chief. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999. xxiii, 1738 p.)
39  In Geremek's words, «We don't need to define [civil society].  We see 
and feel it»  (quoted in Flora Lewis, «Civil Society: Its Limits and 
Needs», International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1989.  According to 
Lebedev, «Specialists in political science refuse to draw a clear-cut 
distinction between [civil society and law-governed state]; they consider 
it a difficult task.  As a lawyer, I find it an irrelevant task as well» 
(See V.M. Lebedev, «O systeme grazhdanskogo obschestva Rossii», 
Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i regional'noe razvitie [«On the System of Civil 
Society in Russia», Civil Society and Regional Development] (Scientific and 
Practical Conference, 22 April 1994, Tomsk. Tomsk Oblast Duma & Tomsk State 
University, 1994. E.I. Chernyak, ed.), p. 16).  A former prime minister of 
the Czech Republic Václav Klaus also confesses that he find the term civil 
society «superfluous», a «hollow phrase» and claims that he does «not think 
that a civil society is different from a democratic society».  (See «Civil 
Society After Communism: Rival Visions. Václav Havel and Václav Klaus with 
Commentary by Petr Pithart», 7 Journal of Democracy 1 (January 1996), p. 18).
40  M. Steven Fish, «Rethinking Civil Society: Russia's Fourth Transition», 
5 Journal of Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 41.
41  Alexander Lukin, «Forcing the Pace of Democratization», 10 Journal of 
Democracy 2 (April 1999), p. 39.
42  Especially after adoption of the 1961 CPSU Program proclaiming that the 
Soviet society had entered the stage of «developed socialism».
43  Philosophsky slovar' [Philosophical Dictionary] (Moscow: Politizdat, 
1975. 3rd edition. M.M. Rozenthal, ed.), p. 93).
44  See S.S. Alekseev, Sotsial'naya tsennost' prava v sovetskom obschestve 
[Social Value of Law in the Soviet Society] (Moscow: 1971), p. 193);  A.A. 
Mishin, Tsentral'niye organy vlasti burzhuaznikh gosudarstv [The Central 
Organs of Power in Bourgeois Countries] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 1972), 
p. 10;  V.N. Danilenko, Deklaratsiya prav i real'nost'. K 200-letiyu 
Deklaratsii prav cheloveka i grazhdanina [Declaration of Rights and 
Reality: 200th Anniversary of Adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 1989), p. 55.
45  Yeltsin's rule was characterized by U.S. Representative Christopher 
Smith (R-NJ) as a kleptocratic regime «masquerading as a democracy» (quoted 
on Johnson's Russia List, # 2277, 22 July 1998).  The word «masquerade» is 
apparently very dear to the hearts of American observers.  Compare, for 
instance, to: «Yeltsin, a Soviet usurper masquerading as a democrat» (Anne 
Williamson, «An Inconvenient History», Johnson's Russia List, # 3477, 1 
September 1999).  As a reminder, just several years ago Yeltsin's opponents 
in the Russian Supreme Soviet were defamed as «communist fascists 
masquerading as parliamentarians» (Thomas Oliphant, «Another Clash with the 
Beast», The Boston Globe, 6 October 1993).
46  As Eric Kraus, Chief Strategist of Nikoil Capital Markets, correctly 
observed: «In the early 1990s, disastrously incompetent economic advice 
from Western experts was eagerly accepted by the successive (and no less 
incompetent) transition governments» (Eric Kraus, «On the Barricades: 
Renegotiating the Paris Club», Johnson's Russia List, #5053, 26 January 
2001; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5053.html).  More on 
Yeltsin's kleptocracy and the U.S. role in its creation, see: Russia's Road 
to Corruption. How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead 
of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People (U.S. House of 
Representatives, Washington, D.C. Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia. 
Christopher Cox, Chairman. September 2000), available at: 
www.house.gov/republican-policy/russia/home.html.
47  Electoral commissions were formed for each constituency by the 
corresponding Soviets (Councils) to supervise and direct the election of 
deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989.  They had 
significant powers to control the electoral process, especially at the 
stage of registration of candidate deputies.  In cases when there were more 
than two nominees, Art.38 of the USSR Election Law allowed electoral 
commissions to hold preelection meetings, question the candidates, and then 
eliminate even properly nominated individuals.
48  Laws «On the President of the RSFSR» and «On the Election of the 
President of the RSFSR» were adopted on April 24, 1991.  Subsequently, the 
fourth CPD session (May 21-25, 1991) introduced a new chapter (Chapter 
13-1) to the Constitution instituting presidency in Russia.
49  Yeltsin was so sure in his victory that before the elections he sent 
Andrei Kolossovsky to Washington to start preparations for his first visit 
to the USA as the Russian President; the visit began some ten days after 
the elections.
50  «NDI Calls for Democratic Development Assistance to the USSR». (Senate 
- September 27, 1990), Congressional Record, 27 September 1990. S14080.
51  «The New Soviet Union» -- Hon. Dan Schaeffer (Extension of Remarks - 
September 11, 1991), Congressional Record, 11 September 1990. E2977.
52  Ruslan Khasbulatov was elected to the Russian Parliament as a Yeltsin 
supporter.  Upon Yeltsin's suggestion, he was elected First Deputy Chairman 
of the Russian Supreme Soviet as a representative of one of the ethnic 
minorities (Chechen), which had greatly suffered under Stalin.  Even when 
six of the seven leaders of the Supreme Soviet in February 1991 denounced 
Yeltsin for his arbitrary methods of ruling, Khasbulatov continued to 
support him.  When Yeltsin was elected President, he personally named 
Khasbulatov as his successor.  Many deputies refused to vote for him at the 
fifth CPD session in July 1991 because of his lack of independence, as they 
suspected, from  Yeltsin. When Khasbulatov was finally elected Chairman of 
the Supreme Soviet in October 1991, it was interpreted as a Yeltsin victory.
53  Anders Åslund, «The Making of Economic Policy in 1989 & 1990», in 
Milestones in Glasnost & Perestroika. The Economy (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1991.  Ed A.Hewett & Victor H. Winston, eds.), p. 346.
54  David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: 
Random House, 1997), p. 71.
55  See «Pozitsiya» [The Position], Russky obozrevatel' (Moscow), No. 1, 
1995. P. 22.
56  See Human Rights and Legal Reform in the Russian Federation (New York: 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, March 1993), p. 45.  As a result of 
elections at the local level, held simultaneously with the Russian 
parliamentary elections of 1990, radical democrats scored particularly 
impressive victories in the City Councils of Moscow and Leningrad: 
candidates from Democratic Russia bloc won 292 out of 465 seats in 
Mossoviet, and 355 out of 400 in Lensoviet.  Never again Russian radicals 
would get such results.
57  Judith Devlin, The Rise of the Russian Democrats: The Causes  and 
Consequences of the Elite Revolution (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 
1995. Series «Studies of Communism in Transition»), p. 152-153.
58  Anders Åslund, «Russia's Success Story», 73 Foreign Affairs 5 
(September-October 1994), p. 60.
59  In an assessment of an unbiased American scholar, in September 1993, 
«with a stroke of the pen, Yeltsin had wiped out Russia's embryonic and 
uneasy separation of powers.  Mao had bested Montesquieu» (Robert Sharlet, 
«Russian Constitutional Crisis: Law and Politics Under Yeltsin», 9 
Post-Soviet Politics 4 (October-December 1993), p. 327).  «It was a highly 
risky decision, since it was plainly illegal», wrote a British reporter 
(Jonathan Steele, «Inside Story: Chaos Theory», The Guardian, 13 November 
1993.).  «Rarely in history there has been a coup prepared so ineptly and 
so openly.  Yeltsin violated the constitution so flagrantly that there 
could be no talk of his having 'made a mistake' or 'exceeding his powers'», 
commented a deputy of the Moscow City Council (Boris Kagarlitsky, Square 
Wheels. How Russian Democracy Got Derailed (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1994), p.197).
60  Ibid.
61  Vladimir Shlapentokh named that catastrophic defeat of pro-Yeltsin 
«reformers» and a similarly catastrophic impotence of pollsters in 
predicting the electoral outcome in December of 1993 «the Russian 
disaster»:  «The results of the election shocked... the West, a reaction 
similar to that which occurred with the Sandinista's defeat in the 
Nicaraguan election of 1990, only with a remarkable difference: in one 
case, the West was gloomy, in the other, delighted»  (Vladimir Shlapentokh, 
«Poll Review: The 1993 Russian Election Polls», 58 Public Opinion Quarterly 
(Winter 1984), p. 579, 585.
62  See The Weekly Standard, 19 January 1998.
63  This episode was also described by Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski in 
their book Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against 
Democracy.  When one of the authors challenged Åslund on his claim, he did 
not reply.
64  It's a common problem of Western experts of Russia that facts about 
Russian society are sometimes supplanted by perceptions, which in their 
turn are often based on myths, cliches, or lies.  (The title of 
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, for instance, 
openly indicates that it's «based on the perceptions of business people and 
risk analysts») (emphasis added. - AD).  A typical illustration of such an 
observation is a response to a question asked by an American businessman 
and scholar at a high-profile academic conference in the U.S.: do you think 
that a «well-connected Russian» is likely to be found guilty of 
embezzlement from a foreign owned firm?  «None of the conference 
participants, - wrote the author, - volunteered the opinion that justice 
would prevail».  (Ronald R. Pope, «The Rule of Law and Russian Culture - 
Are They Compatible?», 7 Demokratizatsiya (Spring 1999), p. 204; emphasis 
added. - AD).  How reliable and convincing is such «opinion»?  Why is it 
that none of the conference participants expressed a different point of 
view?  Not a single person had the slightest doubt and raised his hand to 
indicate it?  Why such «opinion» is so far away not only from the views of 
Russian lawyers (who could be accused of being biased and non-objective), 
but from the position of Peter Solomon, probably the most eloquent 
contemporary foreign expert on the Russian judicial system, who in his 
latest publications has been describing «positive developments» in the 
Russian legal and judicial sphere (including the spread of «constitutional 
litigation and the framing of issues in constitutional terms», the 
«dramatic expansion of legal education», and the «success of judges in 
creating their own organizations»), asserting that, «despite the 
disappointments of radical reformers, court reform in Russia is not dead», 
and insisting that, for instance, «the decisions by three different sets of 
judges in the Nikitin case stand as testimony to the reality of change in 
the administration of justice in Russia»? (See, for instance: Peter H. 
Solomon, Jr., «The Persistence of Judicial Reform in Contemporary Russia», 
6 East European Constitutional Review 4 (Fall 1997)); Peter H. Solomon, Jr. 
& Todd S. Foglesong, «The Procuracy and the Courts in Russia: A New 
Relationship?», 9 East European Constitutional Review 4 (Fall 
2000)).  Reliability of the conference participants' «opinion» becomes even 
more questionable, because in another article the same R. Pope wrote about 
taking to Russian court someone Veksler, a former manager of his «model 
American home in Vladimir» and a daughter of an «influential local 
official», on charges of embezzlement.  Despite Veksler's influential 
«connections» and presence of «one of the most expensive defense attorneys» 
in the city, the Vladimir district court found her guilty of the «theft of 
an exceptionally large sum of money» and sentenced her to 5 years in 
prison.  The Vladimir Oblast court upheld the decision, and the Russian 
Supreme Court found no legal basis for it to review the lower courts' 
decisions.  (See Ronald R. Pope, «An Illinois Yankee in Tsar Yeltsin's 
Court: Justice in Russia», 7 Demokratizatsiya (Fall 1999)).
65  See, for instance: A.S. Avtonomov, «Pravovoe oformlenie grazhdanskogo 
obschestva v Rossii» [Legal Regulations of Civil Society in Russia], 
Predstavitel'naya vlast': monitoring, analiz, informatsiya, No. 1, 1995, p. 
73-88;  E.Yu. Dogadaylo, «Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i gosudarstvennaya 
vlast'» [Civil Society and State Power], Predstavitel'naya vlast': 
monitoring, analiz, informatsiya, No. 2, 1996, p. 48-56; V.V. Lapaeva, 
«Obschestvennoe mnenie kak institut grazhdanskogo obschestva» [Public 
Opinion as an Institution of Civil Society], Advokat, No. 3, 1997, p. 
69-81; V.V. Lapaeva, «Obschestvennoe mnenie i zakonodatel'stvo» [Public 
Opinion and Legislation], Sotsiologicheskie issledovania, No. 9, 1997, p. 
16-27; Yu. Nisnevich, «Problemy vzaimodeystviya obschestva i vlasti v 
Rossii» [Problems of Interrelations Between Society and Power in Russia], 
Informatsionniye resursy Rossii, No. 4, 1997, p. 6-10.
66  Larry Diamond, «Civil Society and Democratic Development: Why the 
Public Matters», in: Democratization: Does the Public Matter? (Papers from 
the 1996 Distinguished International Lecture Series. Cheri Long, Douglas 
Midgett, Issue Editors. Center for International and Comparative Studies, 
The University of Iowa, 1999), p. 6.  According to Larry Diamond's more 
detailed definition, civil society is the «realm of autonomous, voluntary 
associations that pursue limited ends in the public sphere, 
self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and 
bound by a legal order or [a] set of shared rules» (Larry Diamond, 
«Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation», p. 5.)
67  Quoted in: Susan Shell, «Conceptions of Civil Society. Review of The 
Idea of Civil Society, by Adam B. Seligman and of Civil Society and 
Political Theory, by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato», 5 Journal of 
Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 124).
68  See, for instance, Grigory N. Manov, «Vstuplenie», Grazhdanskoe 
obschestvo i pravovoe gosudarstvo: predposylki formirovaniya, 
[«Introduction», Civil Society and Law-Governed State: Prerequisites of 
Creation] (Moscow: IGiP AN SSSR, 1991. G.N. Manov, ed.), p. 5-6.
69  Pravovoe gosudarstvo v Rossii: zamysel i realnost' (k desyatiletiu 
perestroyki). Krugliy stol yuristov, 19.04.1995 [Rule of Law in Russia: 
Concept and Reality (the 10th Anniversary of Perestroika). A Roundtable of 
Lawyers, 19 April 1995] (Moscow: Gorbachev-Fund, «April-85», 1995), p. 16.
70  Oleg Rumyantsev, Osnovy konstitutsionnogo stroya Rossii [The Basics of 
the Constitutional System of Russia] (Moscow, 1995), p. 76.  Also see: Oleg 
Rumyantsev, «Stanovlenie grazhdanskogo obschestva v Vostochnoy Evrope», 
Sovremenniy sotsializm i problemy perestroyki [«Emergence of Civil Society 
in Eastern Europe», Modern Socialism and Problems of Perestroika] (Moscow: 
IEMSS AN SSSR, 1989), p. 6-31.
71  See, for instance, Z.M. Chernilovsky «Grazhdanskoye obschestvo: opyt 
issledovaniya» [Civil Society: An Attempt of a Research], Gosudarstvo i 
pravo, No. 6, 1992, p. 142-151; O.V. Martyshin, «Neskol'ko tezisov o 
perspektivakh grazhdanskogo obschestva v Rossii» [Several Observations on 
Perspectives of Civil Society in Russia], Gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 5, 1996, 
pp. 3-13.
72  M. Steven Fish, «Rethinking Civil Society: Russia's Fourth Transition», 
p. 34.
73  Robert Sharlet, «Citizen and State under Gorbachev and Yeltsin», in 
Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (White, Pravda & Gitelman, 
eds. 1994), pp. 128.  Yeltsin's attempt to block any public discussion of 
the Draft Constitution was characterized by British scholars as «hardly a 
sound precedent of democratic practice» (Stephen White and Ronald J. Hill, 
«Russia, Former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe», in The Referendum 
Experience in Europe (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996. Michael Gallagher 
and Pie Vincenzo Uleri, eds.), p. 163).
74  In an alarming conclusion of an American scholar, Yeltsin «demonstrates 
how attempts to copy the American system are likely to end up in 
dictatorship, as they have so often in Latin America» (Robert V. Daniels, 
«Yeltsin's No Jefferson. More Like Pinochet», The New York Times, 2 October 
1993, p.23).
75  Richard Rose, «Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem 
of Trust», 5 Journal of Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 19.
76  A slightly smaller percentage of supporters of Unity - 41 percent - 
explain their choice by the«state-oriented» policy of the party.
77  Otnoshenie naseleniya k federal'nim zakonam i organam gosudarstvennoy 
vlasti [Attitude of Population to Federal Laws and Bodies of State Power] 
(Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Russian Government 
(Moscow), July 2000), p. 11.
78  Nikolay Popov, «Kakaya vera nas spasyot» [What Faith Will Save Us], 
Novoe vremya, No. 2918, 14 October 2001; also available 
at  http://www.newtimes.ru/newtimes/oio.asp?n=2918.
79  «Civil Society After Communism: Rival Visions. Václav Havel and Václav 
Klaus with Commentary by Petr Pithart», 7 Journal of Democracy 1 (January 
1996), p. 18).
80  B.G. Mogilnitsky, «Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i istoricheskoe soznanie», 
Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i regional'noe razvitie [Civil Society and Historic 
Consciousness», Civil Society and Regional Development. Scientific and 
Practical Conference, 22 April 1994, Tomsk] (Tomsk Oblast Duma & Tomsk 
State University, 1994. E.I. Chernyak, ed.), p. 6.)
81  In Kartashkin's words, «Many human rights activists, particularly in 
the capital, unfortunately continue their destructive struggle -- they have 
not forgotten their dissident past, although the situation has totally 
changed».  (Interfax, 22 June 2001).
82  Russian radical liberals are notorious for their Russophobic diatribes 
and allegations.  In a typical statement of Sergei Kovalev, for instance, 
it's not Yeltsin's government (which was overwhelmingly supported by 
Kovalev in 1990-1994, when he first chaired a parliamentary committee and 
then a presidential commission), that bears the main responsibility for the 
war in Chechnya, but «the traditional Russian state» (emphasis added. - 
AD).  In Kovalev's words, the Russian state is a «clumsy, unintelligent 
monster» which «is inherently incapable of properly evaluating 
situations,... cannot live without using force,... does not know how to 
resolve problems bloodlessly, for blood is its favorite food» (emphasis 
added. - AD).  According to Kovalev, it was not Yeltsin's government of 
«reformers» (like Kovalev himself), who multiplied endless problems of 
Russia, but «the traditional Russian state» itself.  The state which «does 
not really know how to resolve problems at all. It only knows how to create 
them» (Sergei Kovalev, «Russia After Chechnya», The New York Review of 
Books, 17 July 1997, p. 28).  After the crushing blow to radical 
«democrats» at the December 1993 parliamentary elections Yuri Afanasyev 
concluded that «support for communist and fascist blocs» should be 
explained by «the essential nature of the Russian people» (Yuri N. 
Afanasyev, «Russian Reform Is Dead», 73 Foreign Affairs 2 (March/April 
1994), p. 22).  Why didn't Afanasyev think that it was because of this 
«communist and fascist nature» of the Russian people, that Russians voters 
twice elected him, first to the USSR parliament (from my electoral district 
in Noginsky raion of Moscow Oblast), and then to the parliament of the 
Russian Federation?  But when he and other radicals lost people's trust, 
and those very people, who voted for Afanasyev in 1989 and 1990, changed 
their mind and voted for his opponents, he began saying that we, Russians, 
are actually natural born fascists.  Another radical politician and leader 
of the scandalous Democratic Union Valeriya Novodvorskaya argues that 
«Russia is not only a country of fools, but a country of bastards 
too».  She regrets that Russia «has never been smashed. Completely smashed, 
like Hitler».  In her words, «Gaidar is a nice man... Yeltsin is Russia's 
fire-bird. And we won't let her fly away!»  (Compare to Åslund's 
statements: Gaidar is «one of the great historical personalities of our 
time»; «President Yeltsin is Russia's last best hope» (see: The Economic 
and Political State of Russia. A Presentation by Yegor Gaidar, January 20, 
2000 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Russian and Eurasian 
Program, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 24, 2000); Jeremy Weinberg, «1996: Reforms 
Iced, Market Bulls Ran Anyway», The St. Petersburg Times, 20-26 January 
1997)).  Novodvorskaya's credo was honestly expressed in the following 
words: «If in order to wipe out Communists, Fascists and Imperialists, it 
will be necessary to wipe out from earth (steret' s litsa zemli) this 
country with all its population, we will do that without any hesitation (my 
ne drognem)!»  No surprise that in Novodvorskaya's opinion the «best day in 
our history of the 20th Century» was «the morning of October 4 [1993], when 
the White House was burning».  (Quoted in: «Pozitsiya» [Position], Russky 
obozrevatel', No. 1, 1995. P. 22).  During the 1996 and 2000 presidential 
election campaigns Novodvorskaya made a major disservice to Yavlinsky when 
she appealed to Russian «democrats» to support him.  It was a sufficient 
reason for many of us not to give him our votes.
83  Polit.ru, 11 July 2001.
84  See Alexander Verkhovsky, «Operation Civic Forum», 2 RFE/RL (Un)Civil 
Societies 30 (1 August 2001).
85  In a similar case, the Moscow Oblast court on September 27, 2001, 
refused to agree to an appeal by the RF Ministry of Justice to disband the 
National Bolshevik Party headed by a detained writer and a former Soviet 
emigre in France and U.S.A. Eduard Limonov  (Interfax, 28 September 
2001).  The refusal underlines a growing independence and nonpartisanship 
of the Russian courts.
86  See Larry Diamond, «Civil Society and Democratic Development: Why the 
Public Matters», p. 7.
87  As of 1 September 2001, state property in Russia includes 9,855 
federally-owned state unitary enterprises, 34,868 institutions and 4,308 
share packages.  The share packages differ in size.  In 84 joint-stock 
companies the Russian Federation owns 100 percent of their authorized 
capitals, in 605 - more than 50%, and in 1,719 - less than 25%  («Na 
prodazhu» [For Sale], Argumenty i fakty , No. 39, 26 September 2001, also 
available at  http://www.aif.ru/aif/1092/06_03.php).
88  Ibid.
89  Polit.ru, April 21, 2000.
90  Grigoriy Yavlinsky, «Liberalizm dlya vsekh» [Liberalizm for All], 
Obschaya gazeta, No. 26, 28 June 2001; also available 
at  www.og.ru/archieve/2001/26/mat/mn1.shtml.
91  Dmitry Furman, «Kogda vozmozhen liberalizm dlya vsyekh» [When 
Liberalism for All Is Possible], Obschaya gazeta, No. 28, 13 July 
2001;  also available at www.og.ru/archieve/2001/28/mat/mn1.shtml.
92  11% of the respondents were undecided.  Activities in the spheres of 
culture, education and sports, and work with children and teenagers attract 
4% of the respondents.  3% of those polled were prepared to work with 
charitable organizations that give social aid to elderly and lonely people, 
homeless children and low-income families.  2% of the respondents would 
like to join environmental protection organizations and take part in city 
beautification projects (planting trees and flowers, and cleaning 
courtyards).  The same percentage of the respondents said they would like 
to work with trade unions and with war veterans' organizations.  And one 
percent of those polled would prefer to join hobby groups, for instance 
societies of beer-lovers, car drivers or dog owners. (Interfax, 2 July 2001).
93  The report is available 
at  www.unicef-icdc.org/presscentre/presskit/monee7/youth.
94  Richard Rose, «Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem 
of Trust», p. 25-26.  Russia is not unique in this respect.  Rose finds a 
«similar level of distrust» in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland (p. 25).  A new study also finds that the «distribution of attitudes 
toward democracy within the Russian population is not so very different 
from many other countries in transition» (Timothy J. Colton, Michael 
McFaul, Are Russians Undemocratic? (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, No. 20, June 2001), p. 21).  Overall, the results of Colton-McFaul's 
study corroborate conclusions of a group of Iowan scholars made several 
years ago (based on 600 completed interviews in 1990, 1,400 in 1991, 1,300 
in 1992 and 1,750 in 1995) that Russian legal values are close or similar 
to those in other former Soviet republics or in the U.S.: «The Russian mass 
public is not... hostile to the rule of law... We discover more support for 
legal procedure [in Russia] than might have been expected... On the whole 
Russians show greater support for legality than do Lithuanians... We find 
American and Russian publics to have a very similar proportion of those 
willing to jettison suspects' rights in the name of fighting crime» 
(William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, and Vicki L. Hesli, «Russians and 
the Legal System: Mass Views and Behaviour in the 1990s», 13 Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 3 (September 1997), p. 24, 25, 
45; also see:  William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, and Vicki L. Hesli, 
«Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and 
Implications for Democracy», 24 British Journal of Political Science 
(1994), p. 183-223;  Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. 
Reisinger, «Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet 
Russia and Ukraine», 59 Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring 1995), p. 
1-40;  William M. Reisinger, «Legal Orientations and the Rule of Law in 
Post-Soviet Russia», Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective 
(London: McMillan; NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999. Sally J. Kenney, William 
M. Reisinger and John C. Reitz, eds.), p. 172-192).
95  See Nikolay Popov, «Fantazii na temu demokratii» [Democratic 
Fantasies], Novoe vremya, No. 34, 2001; also available 
at  www.newtimes.ru/oio.asp?n=34.
96  The poll was held in early April 2000 in early April in 94 urban and 
rural areas of Russia's 40 regions in every «economic-geographical area» of 
the country.  The results were reported by Interfax, 19 April 2000.
97  The analytical report was prepared for the Russian Government and not 
for publication; on file with the author.
98  A later opinion poll (conducted by the All-Russia Center for Public 
Opinion Studies in mid-January 2001) indicated similar results showing that 
75 percent of Russians believe that in historical terms the Yeltsin era did 
Russia more bad than good (with 15 percent who don't think so). See 
Strana.ru, 1 February 2001.
99  The poll represented Russia's adult population (18 and above) according 
to gender, age, level of education, location, and type of populated area; 
with possible error of about 3.8%.  The results are reported on Polit.ru, 
21 April 2000.
100  Interfax, 12 July 2001.
101  A recent survey of 400 journalists across Russia conducted by the 
Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences found that 30 
percent of them had inserted hidden advertising into stories «regularly» or 
«occasionally».  Overall, 67 percent of journalists had done it «more than 
once».  «Journalists... themselves have destroyed their image as defenders 
of liberties», admits political editor of St. Petersburg-based daily 
Nevskoe vremya (quoted in Galina Stolyarova, «Poll Highlights Media's 
Weakness», The St. Petersburg Times, 28 August 2001). Also available at 
www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/times/699/top/t_4459.htm.
102  See Oleg Poptsov's interview in: Alexander Gubanov, «Televidenie eto 
mekhanizm upravleniya stranoy. Mekhanizm upravleniya stranoy nuzhdaetsya v 
remonte» [Television is a Mechanism of the Country Control. The Mechanism 
of the Country Control Needs to Be Repaired], Obschaya gazeta, No. 31, 26 
July 2001. P. 6.  Also available at www.og.ru/archieve/2001/31/mat/i2.shtml.
103  Yuri Levada, «Sotsvopros» [A Social Question], Novaya gazeta, No. 53, 
30 July 2001;  also available 
at  2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/53n/n53n-s22.shtml  An earlier opinion 
poll (held in March 2001) had similar results: 57 percent of Russians 
favored reimposing some kind of censorship over the media, up from 48 
percent in November 2000.  The number of those opposed to censorship 
dropped from 38 to 33 percent during the same interval. (See RFE/RL 
Security Watch, 9 April 2001, quoting Gleb Pavlovsky's Public Opinion 
Foundation website www.fom.ru).
104  In Solzhenitsyn's words, «Sometimes, capital punishment is needed for 
the sake of saving the nation and the state.  In Russia, matters stand this 
way at the moment».
105  Interfax, 28 June 2001.
106  Trud, January 6, 2000.
107  Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963 2nd ed. x, 450 p.), p. 5; 
Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950. X, 322 p.), p. 3.
108  Legislative euphoria had some positive effects at the early stage of 
legal reforms in the USSR. For example, from June 1987 to the autumn of 
1988 only, approximately 1,200 federal and 7,500 republican decrees that 
hindered the Soviet transition to the rule of law were repealed.  In the 
same period, more than 33,000 federal and 80,000 republican ministerial and 
departmental rules and regulations concerning economic and social relations 
in the country were abolished. (See, for instance: Alexei Klishin, 
«Economic Reform and Contract Law in the USSR», Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 1990, p. 253.)
109 See, for instance: Kathy Lally, «Pardons Turn Rare in Putin's Russia», 
The Baltimore Sun, 14 June 2001; Masha Lipman, «How Putin Pardons», The 
Washington Post, 17 July 2001; Sophie Lambroschini, «Russia: Pardon System 
Plays Mercy Role Amid A Cruel Society», RFE/RL, 23 February 2001; available 
at  www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/02/23022001115056.asp.
110  Personally, it always bothered me why in nearly all of his TV and 
newspaper interviews Pristavkin always speaks about Yelena Kozlova who 
stole a goat worth $20 and was sentenced to five and a half years in 
prison, as if she was the only one pardoned by his commission.  Apparently, 
he told the same story to Kathy Lally whose article in The Baltimore Sun 
starts with a description of that really outrageous and intolerable 
case.  But what about the remaining 12,000 pardons a year?  The 
above-mentioned figures give the answer.
111  The categorization of crimes in the Russian Criminal Code is more 
complex than in the felony-misdemeanor division in the U.S.  The four 
categories of crimes and their maximum punishments are: minor crime (up to 
2 years in prison); moderately serious crime (up to 5 years in prison); 
serious crime (up to 10 years in prison); very serious crime (over 10 years 
in prison, life imprisonment or death, not implemented since Russia's 
admittance to the Council of Europe in February 1996).  (See, for instance: 
Gennady M. Danilenko & William Burnham, Law and Legal System of the Russian 
Federation (Juris Publishing, 2000. 2nd ed.); William Butler, Russian Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
112  Russian press wrote about defense attorneys who proudly advertise 
their service saying that they have an access to the Clemency Committee, 
but the fee for that service is high (dorogo stoit).  (See Marina Gridneva, 
«Nasil'nik mil ne budet», Moscovskii komsomolets, 9 July 2001).
113  The list could be easily compiled by the Pristavkin's commission and 
included Marc Rich, a tax fraud racketeer and fugitive from the law, Susan 
Rosenberg, an urban terrorist, John Deutch, an ex-Director of CIA; Henry G. 
Cisneros, a former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Susan H. 
McDougal, an old business partner of the Clintons and their accomplice in 
the Whitewater scandal; Patricia Hearst, a heroine of Soviet propaganda in 
the mid-1970s; and Clinton's half-brother Roger, who had pleaded guilty to 
distributing cocaine in Arkansas; although not an Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard.
114  Ronald Reagan, for instance, pardoned 406 people in 8 years.  70 
people were pardoned, only one commutation granted, and 1,554 executive 
clemency applications denied in 1989-1993.  (See remarkable studies by P.S. 
Ruckman, Jr. of clemency in the U.S.: «Executive Clemency in the United 
States: Origins, Development, and Analysis (1900-1993)», 27 Presidential 
Studies Quarterly (Spring 1997); «Keys to Clemency Reform: Knowledge, 
Transparency», Jurist, 7 March 2001; available 
at  jurist.law.pitt.edu/pardonop5.htm).  A complete list of executive 
clemency applications of 1953-1999 is available 
at  www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/pardoncharts/jopdata.htm.
115  See Marina Gridneva, op.cit.  It's amazing that criticism of Putin's 
decision to improve the effectiveness of the Clemency Commission's work 
comes mainly from the U.S., a country having the largest prison population 
in the world (approximately 2 million in 2001; twice bigger than in 
Russia), executing somebody every five days on average, and, according to 
the latest Amnesty International report, continuing «to violate 
international standards by using the death penalty against the mentally 
impaired, individuals who were under 18 at the time of the crime, and 
defendants who received inadequate legal representation». (Amnesty 
International Report 2000; available 
at  web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webamericas?  Also see another Amnesty 
International report:  U.S.A.: Failing the Future. Death Penalty 
Developments, March 1998 - March 2000; available 
at  web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR510032000?)  Between 1977 and 1999, the 
U.S. state authorities commuted only 40 death sentences on «humanitarian 
grounds» nationwide.  (See U.S.A: Killing Without Mercy: Clemency 
Procedures in Texas (Amnesty International, 1 June 1999; available 
at  www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AMR510851999).
116  According to the latest poll conducted by ROMIR-Gallup International, 
45.3 percent of Russians do not trust their government comparing to 45.1 
percent who do (Interfax, 30 August 2001).  In Eugeny Primakov's words, 
«the hardest consequence and lesson of the crisis [of August, 1998] has 
been not the fall of production or the fall of the ruble, but a total 
crisis of trust»  (ITAR-TASS, 4 December 1998).
117  The definition is used in the publications of economist Alexander 
Anisimov and political scientist Alexander Kalinin concluding that 
Yeltsin's regime cannot be characterized as an «occupation regime» because 
the term «occupation» still presumes a certain degree of care and 
protection.  A more adequate definition of the rule of Yeltsin «reformers» 
is a «liquidation regime», i.e. a regime liquidating the Russian state, 
people and culture.  (From an interview with A. Kalinin, Moscow, 4 May 2001).
118  Russia's industrial product has plummeted about 50 percent.  Back in 
1941-45, when Hitler's troops were occupying about half of the European 
part of the USSR, when more than 1,700 cities and 70,000 villages were 
destroyed in warfare, and about 26.5 million Soviet citizens lost their 
lives, the reduction of the Soviet industrial product was only about 30 
percent.
119  The conclusion belongs to Murray Feshbach, former branch chief of at 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census and a research professor of Georgetown 
University, now a Senior Scholar at the Wilson Center. (See The Washington 
Post, 12 July 1995).  Another American scholar draws our attention to an 
important detail: «Remember: the Russian crisis has erupted in a country in 
a formal state of peace.  In origin, duration, and character, Russia's 
mortality crisis is fundamentally different from those others», like in 
Spain (1936-39), Western Germany (1943-46), Japan (1944-45), and South 
Korea (1950-53), which had «record cruel plunges in countrywide life 
expectancy around the middle of the twentieth century.  Merely to note 
those dates, however, is to see a contrast between these cases and the case 
of Russia. The mortality crises in Spain, Western Germany, Japan, and South 
Korea were direct consequences of wars or civil war». (See Nicholas 
Eberstadt, «Russia: Too Sick to Matter?», Policy Review (The Heritage 
Foundation), No. 95, June & July 1999; available at 
www.policyreview.com/jun99/eberstadt.html).
120  In the beginning of 2000, Anders Åslund, an economic advisor to the 
Russian Government in 1991-1994, made a new attempt to somehow beautify the 
results of «reforms» and his work in Russia.  According to him, «a 
frequently cited statistic is that the average life expectancy for Russian 
men has declined [from 63.9 years in 1990. - AD] to 57.7 years.  But that 
was in 1994.  After that, the figure increased... to 61.8 years in 1998» 
(Anders Åslund, «Underselling Russia's Economy», New York Times, 18 January 
2000; also available at 
www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Underselling.asp).  The attempt was 
short-lived.  According to the RF Statistics Committee average life 
expectancy for Russian men in 1999 was 58.9 years, one of the lowest index 
among the developed countries of the world (see A. Mikhailova, «Statistika 
vozrastnoy struktury naseleniya Rossii» [Statistics on the Age Structure of 
the Russian Population], Ekonomika i zhizn', No. 7, 2001).  What was even 
more important for Russian demography is that in 1999 Russia's shrinking 
population took its largest post-Soviet drop, with the reduction of 
population by 0.49 percent or 716,900 (to 145.6 million).  It's indicative, 
that in his latest article (which is partly based on his piece 
«Underselling Russia's Economy») Åslund describes 10 «myths» about the 
current socio-economic situation in Russia, but no longer repeats his 
assertions about growing life expectancy in Russia.  Instead of it, he 
takes comfort in explaining the demographic catastrophe in the country by 
two factors: all-European tendency of low birth rates and Russian high 
death rates.  (See «Think Again, Russia!», Foreign Policy, July-August 
2001; also see his «Mif o kollapse proizvodstva posle krusheniya 
kommunizma», Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 7, 2001, p. 115-138).  The second 
factor is certainly true, although it is not limited to the generation of 
those who were born in 1930-1945 only, as Åslund says.  But the first 
factor is another deception, because low birth rates in Russia and Europe 
have different reasons, and don't mean much by themselves.  What matters is 
an enormous reduction of births in Russia (from about 2.5 million in 1987 
to about 1.25 million in 1999) with a similarly enormous growth of deaths 
(from about 1.55 million in 1987 to about 2.2 million in 1999), whereas in 
Western Europe we see practically parallel lines of births and deaths (for 
instance, in Germany a number of births in 1980 was about 0.9 million and 
in 1999 - about 0.8 million with a number of deaths in 1980 - about 0.95 
million and in 1999 - about 0.85 million; in Italy - a number of births in 
1980 was about 0.6 million and in 1999 - about 0.55 million with a number 
of deaths in 1980 - about 0.55 and about 0.6 million death in 1999).  As 
Murray Feshbach's study shows, if in European countries (like Germany or 
Italy) the net ratio is close to 1.1 deaths to every birth, in Russia, 
deaths exceeded births by 929,600 in 1999, a ratio of 1.8:1.  Feshbach's 
verdict: Russia is facing a «demographic Chernobyl that would give a 
fearful meaning to the word meltdown». (Murray Feshbach, «Russia's 
Population Meltdown», 15 The Wilson Quarterly, 1 (Spring 2001), p. 18, 
21).  Another «selective truth» is Åslund's triumphant statement that 
infant mortality in Russia «plunged by 17 percent from 1993 to 1998» (in 
the same «Think again, Russia!»), as if the Russian «reformers» should be 
praised for that, and his inexplicable silence about the fact that infant 
mortality more than doubled in Russia between 1990 and 1993: from 14 per 
1,000 live births to 30, and that the 17 percent reduction of infant 
mortality is simply miserable comparing to that terrible growth.  (A study 
by Carl Haub, Chair of Population Information at the Washington-based 
Population Reference Bureau, frequently quoted at the World Bank Transition 
Newsletter. The Newsletter About Reforming Economies, available 
at  www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/apr95/pgs18-19.htm).  And that's 
exactly for what we should «thank» the «reformers» and their Western 
consultants!  (To what extent we can trust official statistics in Russia 
today is also a question.  The same M. Feshbach, for instance, mentioned a 
possibility that the correct infant mortality figure in 1997 was closer to 
40 per 1,000 live births than the official figure reported as below 
20).  And why does Åslund speak only about infant mortality and not about 
mortality of other age groups, for instance, children?  The authors of a 
new study Young People in Changing Societies (undertaken by the Innocenti 
Research Centre (Florence, Italy) on behalf of UNICEF) estimate that about 
half a million children aged 5-14 who lived in Eastern Europe and USSR in 
1989 have already died, almost half in Russia alone.  The mortality rate 
among young people rose in 11 (out of 27) post-Communist countries, 
particularly within the CIS; it fell in 16 other countries, including the 
Baltic states and Eastern Europe.  The danger of a young person dying was 
three times greater in Russia than in Slovakia, the Czech republic or in 
Hungary.  The report concludes that these deaths are explained by mainly 
social causes and could have been avoided under different social 
conditions. Åslund, however, denies that «average healthcare standards in 
Russian have fallen».  And this is another falsehood, just like his 
allegation that «capitalism has made medicines widely available... and the 
equipment at hospitals has greatly improved».  A special chapter (Chapter 
4; p. 39-52) of the UNEP report Transition 1999. Human Development Report 
for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS is dedicated exclusively to 
health crisis in Russia and other post-Communist countries.  See a 
thoughtful rebuttal to several other Åslund's allegations (including his 
old thesis of a «splendid achievement» of «market reform and privatization» 
in Russia, an «extraordinary improvement in [Russia's] infrastructure», and 
«considerable structural improvements») by Edward Lukas, Moscow 
correspondent of The Economist, on Johnson's Russia List, #5338, 6 July 
2001; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5338.html.  Also see Peter 
Reddaway's rebuttal to Åslund's allegation about «the falling crime rate» 
in Russia as a «result of energetic government efforts» in: The Weekly 
Standard, 2 February 1998.  In his comments «Åslund The Myth Maker», Jim 
Millar (of The George Washington University) wrote: «Economic advisors to 
governments have the same responsibility as medical doctors do to their 
patients.  Above all, they should not make the patient worse.  Second, when 
the patient does get worse they have an obligation to seek second opinions 
and to reconsider their diagnosis and prescriptions.  Anders Åslund, on the 
contrary, now seeks to show that the patient was never sick in the first 
place, nor did the patient become worse after receiving treatment.  Both 
Russia and Ukraine have been Anders' patients, and both remain very sick if 
not terminally so». (Johnson's Russia List, #5167, 24 March 2001; available 
at  www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5167.html).  And in his recent article, John 
Helmer even compared a new appointment of Åslund, having a reputation of a 
«frequent promoter of Chubais' views» (see The Moscow Tribune, 19 April 
1997), to a World Bank team investigating the success of privatization in 
Russia to «having David Irving teach the history of the Holocaust»  (see 
John Helmer, «Hiring Professor Huckster and Inspector Hype», The Russia 
Journal, 4-10 May 2001; also available 
at  www.russiajournal.ru/printer/weekly4587.html).
121  See this comparison at the World Bank Transition Newsletter. The 
Newsletter About Reforming Economies (April 1997), available at 
www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/apr97/pgs24-28.htm.
122  ITAR-TASS, 16 March 2001.
123  This index is 1.5 times smaller than in developed countries.  In the 
U.S. it's currently 85-88 percent.  In the Russian Empire, at the time of 
the 1896/97 census, for 50 guberniya of European Russia the survival rate 
of 16 year olds up to the age 60 was 56 percent.  Contrary to what could be 
expected, especially by Western observers, major improvements occurred in 
the Soviet period (excluding major demographic catastrophe periods such as 
Civil War, collectivization, and World War II) with the growth of the 
considered index to some 72 percent in 1965.  It dropped to 68 percent in 
1982, while now 46 percent of Russian men will not live to retirement 
age.  (See Murray Feshbach, «Comments on Current and Future Demographic and 
Health Issues», Johnson's Russia List, #5338, 10 June 1997).
124  There are between 625,000 (an official figure) and 2 million abandoned 
homeless children in Russia today (see ITAR-TASS, 29 June 1999).  Newspaper 
stories about kids living in cardboard boxes among garbage cans or about a 
6-year-old Vanya Mishukov who was raised by stray dogs (The Guardian, 16 
July 1998) no longer look like a gross dramatization of life in Russia and 
most other former Soviet republics.  (Also see Sergei Rykov, «In Free 
Russia Children Are Raped, Robbed and Murdered», Komsomolskaya Pravda - RIA 
Novosti, 17 April 1997).
125  UNDP Press Release «Men Hardest Hit by Hurried Transition to Free 
Markets in Ex-Soviet Countries» available 
at  www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/hdr99/pr.htm. Russian Nation has not overcome 
the catastrophic consequences of «reforms» yet.  The demographic situation 
in Russia had been assessed as «critical» by experts of the World Health 
Organization (WHO).  In assessment of Dr. Mark Donzon, the WHO European 
Bureau Director, and Mikko Vienonen, Special Representative of the WHO 
Director, Russia's population is expected to fall by another 2.8 million 
over the next three years (from 144.4 million in 2001) and further shrink 
to 130 million by the year 2015. (ITAR-TASS, 2 February 2001).  Was it holy 
naivety, ignorance or deliberate disinformation of the U.S. Senate when on 
September 3, 1993, Strobe Talbott, at that time Ambassador-at-Large for the 
NIS, claimed (in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee) that «national rebirth has begun» in Russia?
126  In the words of Mark Jones, a British writer, «the only two things 
that are certain are that there will be more unrecorded, unlamented Russian 
deaths and that the triumphal pageant of western-inspired «reforms» will 
pass the heaps of corpses by, noses aloft» (Johnson's Russia List, 27 May 
1997).
127  Thomas E. Graham, Jr., «Putin's Russia. Why Economic Reform Requires 
Political Support. Reflections on U.S. Policy Toward Russia», 9 East 
European Constitutional Review 1-2 (Winter-Spring 2000); Martin Malia, «The 
Haunting Presence of Marxism-Leninism», 10 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 
1999), p. 41.  Thomas Graham corrected himself, however, when making the 
following comment: «The [Clinton] administration backed an economic course 
- the so-called «Washington Consensus» - that did not take sufficient 
account of Russian political realities, including a widespread elite and 
popular opposition to that course.  Critics were generally dismissed as 
communists, hard-liners, or economic illiterates.  In the end, the 
administration found itself backing a small, unpopular group of radical 
reformers.  Not only was the economic program not implemented, but the way 
it was pursued cast into doubt American support for the democratization of 
Russia». (Thomas Graham, «US Ignores Russia's Elite At Its Own Peril», 
Christian Science Monitor, 26 Oct. 2000; also available 
at  www.ceip.org/files/publications/grahamusigners.asp).  There is a quite 
adequate legal definition for what was described by Thomas Graham (in his 
witness testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on 
Corruption in Russia and Future U.S. Policy, 30 September 1999) as an 
initiative of «a relatively small circle of senior [U.S.] administration 
officials» to enter into «a partnership with a similarly small circle of 
senior Russian government officials for the purpose of transforming Russian 
society» (Federal News Service, 2 October 1999). The definition is 
'conspiracy'.
128  As it was later cynically explained by an American scholar, if the 
«international community» gives its support to a «traditionally 
undemocratic act», as it did in Russia in September 1993, then this act is 
actually «democratic», albeit «unconstitutionally democratic».  (Donna R. 
Miller, «Unconstitutional Democracy: Ends vs. Means in Boris Yeltsin's 
Russia», 4 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 2 (Fall 1994), p. 876).
129  It was openly admitted by Peter Reddaway (of The George Washington 
University) in his witness testimony before the Senate Hearing on 
Corruption in Russia (30 September 1999), that the United States «have this 
record of involving ourselves not just in economic policymaking in Russia, 
but also in personnel.  It was actually an unwritten condition of the IMF 
loan in 1995 of $6.8 billion that Mr. Chubais would be the person in charge 
of running economic policy.  It was not written into any agreement, but it 
was an unspoken agreement, unrecorded agreement... That is the sort of 
meddling, the sort of attempt to direct Russian policy at the macro 
level.  And supporting Mr. Yeltsin prior to his decision to destroy the 
Russian Parliament in 1993, we gave our permission to do that.  We allowed 
democracy to be subverted in that way.  Those are the sorts of meddling and 
involvement that I think have been very much against our national interest» 
(Federal News Service, 2 October 1999; emphasis added. - AD).
130  Mary McAuley, «The Big Chill. Civil Society in Russia in a New 
Political Season», Ford Foundation Report (Winter 2001); available on 
Johnson's Russia List, #5156, 17 March 2001 
at  www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5156.html.  Russian NGOs cannot be accused 
in being too prude and selective in respect of their sponsors, and that 
concerns not only foreign, but domestic grant-providers too.  Not many 
other things could make a bigger damage to the image of the Sakharov Center 
or the Moscow-based International Foundation for Civil Liberties in the 
eyes of common Russian people then the fact that those civic groups are 
provided with a generous financial support (to be precise, 3 million U.S. 
dollars in the first case, and one million in the other) from robber baron 
B.A. Berezovsky. (See RFE/RL Newsline, 29 August 2001).
131  For example, NGOs working in collaboration with the Russian 
Foundations for Legal Reform have 8 sources of funding of their activities 
with «foreign foundations» constituting the largest source among all of 
them - 22.7%.  In reality, foreign support might be even bigger because 
12.6% of budget coming from «sponsor dues» does not necessarily mean that 
such sponsors are always 'domestic'.  (F.E. Sheregi and E.A. Abrosimova, 
Pravovye initsiativy nekommercheskikh organizatsiy Rossii [Legal 
Initiatives of Noncommercial Organizations of Russia] (Moscow: Russian 
Foundations for Legal Reform, Center for Social Prognosis, 1999), p. 93).
132  Timothy J. Colton, Michael McFaul, op.cit., p. 22.
133  «USAID officials simply misunderstood the relationship between formal 
institutions and civil society: successful legal and political institutions 
are preceded by the development of a culture of respect for the law and 
democratic structures.  Yet USAID supported creating jury trials, party 
systems, the transplantation of civil and commercial codes, and the 
drafting of constitutions in countries completely lacking in a social base 
to support these elements of civil society.  Contractors, forced to respond 
to the political pressures felt by USAID, were in no position to provide 
proposals that explored the tougher route of building a civic 
culture.  From USAID's perspective, building a courtroom in less than two 
months time was more useful than a lengthy program designed to foster 
community values supportive of democratic institutions». (Peter J. 
Stavrakis, «Bull in a China Shop: USAID's Post-Soviet Mission», 4 
Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 2 (Spring 
1996), p. 261. Also available at The American Foreign Policy Council's 
website at  www.afpc.org/issues/bull.htm).
134  «AID programs have failed miserably in helping NIS states develop the 
limited, competent administrative institutions that are essential for the 
breakthrough to civil society... Russia and other successor states have 
inadvertently done the United States a great favor by exposing the 
fundamental incapacity of USAID to achieve assistance goals that promote 
American interests abroad. The lesson to be drawn from USAID's encounter 
with the NIS is that reform is insufficient; if America aspires to provide 
assistance that promotes the development of free-market, civil societies, 
there is no alternative to eliminating AID and replacing it with a leaner, 
more efficient and competent structure» (Peter Stavrakis, op.cit., p. 249, 
248.  Also see Janine R. Wedel, «Clique-Run Organizations and U.S. Economic 
Aid: An Institutional Analysis», 4 Demokratizatsiya 4 (Fall 1996); Janine 
R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to 
Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001.  2nd ed.)); Stephen 
Cohen, Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia 
(New York: Norton, 2000).
135  Timothy J. Colton, Michael McFaul, op.cit., p. 22.  McFaul repeated 
his appeal to the Bush administration to «cut all democratic and economic 
aid to the state and redirect these funds to Russian society» in: «Moscow, 
Misreading Bush», The Washington Post, 23 January 2001.
136  Michael McFaul & Nikolai Zlobin, «Judge Putin by His Democratic Acts, 
Not His Talk», Los Angeles Times, 24 June 2001.
137  In the past, one of the authors of the CEIS report, was a consultant 
of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Moscow.  In its multimillion 
USAID-funded activities (in 1992-1997, the NDI and the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), received $17.4 million from the USAID, to «help 
reformist political parties strengthen their organizational structures and 
their role in elections» (Foreign Assistance. Harvard Institute for 
International Development's Work in Russia and Ukraine (Washington, U.S. 
General Accounting Office: November 1996), p. 37)) NDI, among other things, 
trained a group of approximately 3,000 «reformist-minded political 
activists» in Russia (1992-1996) which ironically included Vladimir Putin, 
who is now described by the same McFaul (in his testimony to the U.S. 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee), as a potential «Russia's Milosevic» 
[in this case, A. Åslund publicly disagrees with his Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace colleague and calls a suggestion that Putin «would be 
Russia's Milosevic» «a flimsy assertion». See his «Think Again, Russia!»], 
someone «willing to use the power of the state and ignore the democratic 
rights of society in the pursuit of his objectives», whose election as a 
new Russian President was not a «positive step» for the U.S. interests in 
Russia (Johnson's Russia List, #4247, 14 April 2000; available at 
www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4247.html).  McFaul contradicts himself in his 
last statement, just like in his (and Colton's) new «formula for democracy» 
'Represent the will of the people within the state, and the institutions 
will follow'.  Doesn't Putin's landslide victory in the 2000 presidential 
election «represent the will of the people»?  Describing the results of a 
recent opinion poll, a VTsIOM sociologist was certainly right when saying 
that President Putin so overshadows all other political and social figures 
in Russia now that there are almost no individuals who serve as leaders of 
an independent civil society.  This is a remarkable shift, the sociologist 
said, from conditions of 1999 when numerous leaders enjoyed significant 
rates of trust and thus could serve as catalysts for the promotion of civil 
society institutions (Izvestiya, 9 October 2001).
138  Sergei Karaganov [Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe of the 
Russian Academy of Science], «Ruled by a 'Kleptocracy'», The Times, 28 
September 1999.
139  The verb kinut' (to con, rip off, swindle) is common in the slang of 
Russian criminals and was used by Anatoly Chubais, «father of 
privatization» and chief negotiator of the 1998 $4.8 billion bailout 
package from IMF, in his interview to Kommersant Daily (8 September 1998) 
when he argued that lying to Western lenders in the days preceding the 
financial meltdown in Russia was the right thing to do: «In such 
situations, the authorities have to do it.  We ought to.  The financial 
institutions understand, despite the fact that we conned them out of $20 
billion, that we had no other way out».  An American journalist naively 
admitted that he found Chubais' statement «especially startling because 
[Chubais] has been widely viewed as one of Russia's 'young reformers,' who 
could be trusted by the West because he favored establishing a market 
economy».  (See Richard C. Paddock, «Russia Lied to Get Loans, Says Aide to 
Yeltsin», Los Angeles Times, 9 September 1998.  Also available 
at  www.afpc.org/issues/infcon.htm)  Chubais' revelations produced a 
discussion on JRL regarding the most adequate translation and «economic» 
interpretation of the word kinut' (does it actually mean to 'con' or 'stiff 
somebody'), and are an excellent illustration of the criminal essence 
(«splendid achievements», in Åslund's words) of the results of monetarist 
reforms in Russia.  (See Johnson's Russia List, #2365, 11 September 
1998).  The term was later used by Jerry Hough when he wrote about the 
Russian reformers who «just conned the IMF, and the IMF then conned Western 
investors» (see Johnson's Russia List, #2399, 29 September 1998).
140  «Secretary of State Powell's Message on 10th Anniversary of Belarus' 
Independence» (of 25 August 2001) available 
at  www.usis.minsk.by/html/powell_10th.html).  American reporters are 
overall much less sophisticated than the State Department officials and 
tend to transform such unclear accusations as [Belarus] «has tried - in 
vain - to stir up hostility toward Euro-Atlantic institutions» and such 
phrases as «retrogression in economic policy and performance» to more 
primitive (thus, more understandable to American public) 
expressions.  Respectively, Alexander Lukashenko has been labeled «stupid», 
«paranoid», someone «with Neanderthal views» (Chicago Tribune, [Editorial], 
29 March 1997), «proto-fascist dictator» (James H. Billington, «Russia, 
Between a Dream and a Nightmare», The New York Times , June 17, 1998), 
«Europe's last dictator» (White House press secretary Ari Fleisher, quoted 
in: RFE/RL Newsline, 18 September 2001), «the Stalinist leader of Belarus», 
and even «an open admirer of Hitler» («Russia and Its Tyrant Neighbor» 
[Editorial], The New York Times, 25 August 1997).  That's about a leader of 
the Nation where every fourth citizen was slaughtered by 
Nazis...  Ironically, one of American Lukashenko-bashers is Pat Buchanan 
denounced by his liberal compatriots as a «defender of Nazis», «Holocaust 
revisionist», «anti-Semite... flirting with fascism» and «praising 
Hitler».  (See, for instance,  www.realchange.org/buchanan.htm).  Provided 
such accusations are true, everything should be all right with Lukashenko, 
if he is trashed by someone like Buchanan.
141  According to official results of the elections, Alexander Lukashenko 
obtained 75.65 percent of the vote.  His rivals Vladimir Hancharyk and 
Sergei Haydukevich got 15.65 and 2.48 percent.  Turnout in the elections 
was 83.86 percent.  (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 September 2001).
142  A group of international observers (citizens of Britain, U.S., Poland 
and Croatia) sent to monitor the presidential elections in Belarus by the 
British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG) testified that «the 
organization of the elections was of a high level», «the secrecy of the 
ballot was observed», «there was a high level of participation», «none 
expressed any fear or pressure, contrary to what was claimed in the Western 
media».  Noting that it is «always critical of early voting, which 
unfortunately exists in many countries including Germany and the U.K.», 
BHHRG concluded that it «saw no reason to challenge the result» of the 
elections.  Whatever flaws can be found in the Belarus presidential 
election, they are hardly as large as the ones that afflicted the US 
presidential election of 2000.  In the end, President Lukashenko was 
elected by the people, and not picked by Belarussian Supreme Court or 
Constitutional Court.  In another report «Belarus 2001: The Pre-electoral 
Situation», BHHRG concluded: «The claims that Belarus is a Stalinist 
dictatorship or «worse than Cuba» - to quote Ambassador Kozak - are 
contrary to the evidence on the ground.  This is proven by the fact that 
foreigners known for their active opposition to the president - like the 
executive director of the International Helsinki Federation (IHF), Aaron 
Rhodes, who has called him «Hitler loving» - are able to visit and remain 
in the country unhindered for long periods of time and hold press 
conferences there».  (Both BHHRG reports are available 
at   www.bhhrg.org/belarus).
143  See «Yeltsin Moves to End Chaos - Hon. Steny H. Hoyer (Extension of 
Remarks)», Congressional Record, 22 September 1993. P. E2219.
144  The activities of the Constitutional Court of Russia were suspended 
after it voted 9 to 4 (in an emergency session immediately after issuance 
of Yeltsin's Decree 1400 dissolving the Russian parliament) that the 
President's action violated Article 121-6 of Constitution, according to 
which the President couldn't use his powers «to dismiss, or suspend the 
activities of, any lawfully elected agencies of state power».  Otherwise, 
the President's powers «are discontinued immediately».  Originally, it was 
an article of the Law «On the President of the RSFSR» (April 1991) that 
later (May 1991) was included into the Constitution and instituted 
presidency in Russia.
145  In 1998, a major Moscow newspaper alleged that U.S. money helped 
finance Yeltsin's electoral campaign.  The newspaper charged that in March 
1996, half a billion dollars (in $100 bank notes) was sent as a diplomatic 
shipment to the U.S. embassy in Moscow.  The embassy officials confirmed 
that information arguing, however, that the shipment was planned to ensure 
that there were enough new $100 bank notes to meet demand in Russia.  The 
explanation didn't hold water, because if the embassy arguments were true, 
the money could have been stored at the Russian Central Bank rather than at 
the embassy.  In the newspaper's interpretation, half a billion dollars was 
quickly «acquired by large Russian banks», which «played an active role in 
the Yeltsin campaign».  As known, Russian legislation prohibits candidates 
from accepting contributions from foreign donors.  (Moskovskii komsomolets, 
11 February 1998; RFE/RL Newsline, 11 February 1998).  The newspaper's 
version got an additional confirmation next year, when Sergei Lisovsky, an 
advertising and show business mogul (detained on 19 June 1996, when trying 
to smuggle a Xerox paper box with $538,000 «black cash» in it from the 
Russian government building), admitted that in the 1996 campaign «the main 
money was Western» (see Novaya gazeta, June 28-July 4, 1999; also quoted 
in: Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 28 June 1999)).  By the way, back in June 
1996, Chubais, the reform icon, bluntly denied that the box or its contents 
even existed: «I am deeply convinced that the so-called box with money is a 
traditional element of a traditional, Soviet-style KGB provocation».
146  See The Guardian, 25 August 2001; also available 
at  www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4245377,00.html.
147  Alice Lagnado, «U.S. Adopts 'Contras Policy' in Communist Belarus», 
The Times, 3 September 2001; also available 
at  www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,3-2001303768,00.html.
148  Mark Almond [of Oxford University], «For Nicaragua, Read Belarus», The 
Guardian, 14 August 2001; also available 
at  www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4242518,00.html.
149  Also see 2 RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 44 (28 November 
2000).
150  Ian Traynor, «Belarussian Foils Dictator-Buster... For Now.  Tested US 
Foreign Election Strategy Fails Against Lukashenko», The Guardian, 14 
September 2001; also available at 
www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4256816,00.html.
151  Alice Lagnado, «Why the Rural Millions Love a Dictator», New 
Statesman, 17 September 2001.
152  Alice Lagnado, «U.S. Adopts 'Contras Policy' in Communist Belarus», 
The Times, 3 September 2001.
153  Jeremy Bransten, «Belarus: President Decrees More Restrictions on 
NGOs», RFE/RL, 21 March 2001.
154  Ian Traynor, op.cit.  According to Russian press, support to 
Belarussian opposition through Eurasia Foundation only has grown from 
$340,000 in 1996 to $1.5 million in 1998 and about $4 million in 2001.
155  Scott Peterson, «US Spends Millions to Bolster Belarus Opposition», 
Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 2001; available 
at  www.csmonitor.com/2001/0910/p7s1-woeu.htm.  The newspaper quoted 
Paulyuk Bykowski, a political writer for the weekly Belarussian Market 
newspaper, saying that «Lukashenko is right that [outside money] flows into 
politics».  Of the 19 or so registered opposition parties, «almost every 
one has 10 to 20 non-governmental organizations [eligible for outside 
cash]».  «Name me any other country where you get paid for being in the 
opposition», a Belarussian journalist wondered, and a newspaper editor 
ridiculed American seminars for their attempts to teach «how we should 
live».  (Scott Peterson, «US Spends Millions to Bolster Belarus 
Opposition», Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 2001; Alice Lagnado, 
«Why the Rural Millions Love a Dictator», New Statesman, 17 September 2001).
156  English translation of the decree is available at 
www.belarusupdate.org/civilsoc/luka_decree.html.
157  Jan Maksymiuk, «Lukashenka Wants Wide-margin Victory», RFE/RL 
Newsline, 7 September 2001.
158  «A.P. Denounces Belarus Authorities», AP Online, 3 August 2001.
159  See, for instance: Jeremy Bransten, «Belarus: President Decrees More 
Restrictions on NGOs», RFE/RL, 21 March 2001.
160  See Ronald C. Monticone, «A Brief Comparative Analysis of the Russian 
Constitution», Constitution of the Russia Federation. With Commentaries and 
Interpretation by American and Russian Scholars (Lawrenceville, VA: 
Brunswick Publ. Corp., 1994), p. 14, 7, 9.
161  See, for instance: Presidential Powers and Human Rights under the 
Draft Constitution of Belarus (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, October 1996).
162  Indeed, if, for instance, according to the Russian Constitution, the 
decision on the President's removal from office must be adopted by a vote 
of two-thirds of the total membership of each chamber of the Federal 
Assembly, and the whole impeachment process is to be accomplished within 
three months after filing the charge against him (Art. 93), the 
Constitution of Belarus has the same provision regarding voting in the 
lower chamber (House of Representatives), but raises the threshold for the 
Senate to three-quarters of its total composition, and limits the time 
frame to one month (Art.88).  Yet, the Russian Constitution provides for 
five stages in the impeachment process (including participation of both the 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts of Russia), which makes the process more 
time-consuming, whereas the impeachment process in Belarus is to be 
accomplished in four stages without involvement of the Constitutional 
Court.  In practical terms, however, the Constitutions of both countries 
make their Presidents technically unimpeachable.
163  Jim Hoagland, «Worse Than Yeltsin», The Washington Post, 12 September 
1999.
164  Michael Specter, «My Boris», The New York Times Magazine, July 26, 
1998; also available 
at  www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2288.html.  Hoagland-Specter's description 
of Yeltsin is a modern paraphrase of Theodore Roosevelt's famous «our son 
of a bitch».
165  A British reporter author has to recognize that President Lukashenko 
is «popular» and correctly notes that «people are living in far worse 
conditions in some parts of Russia and Ukraine» than in Belarus and that 
average pensions in Belarus are about $30 a month, whereas in many Russian 
regions they are three times smaller.  (Alice Lagnado, «Why the Rural 
Millions Love a Dictator», New Statesman, 17 September 2001).  She is also 
right that «most Belorussians» fear that a new, pro-Western leader would 
bring the poverty experienced by many Russians and Ukrainians after the 
transition to a market economy», but still labels Lukashenko as a 
«dictatorial Communist» (Alice Lagnado, «U.S. Adopts 'Contras Policy' in 
Communist Belarus», The Times, 3 September 2001).  Why should Belorussian 
people denounce Lukashenko, if in the last five years Belarus' GDP has 
grown by 36 percent, and the industrial output by 65 percent (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 5 September 2001)?
166  More on problems and fallacies of American 'aid' to Russia see the 
author's recent article «Amerikanskaya «pomoshch» Rossii. Vremya 
kardinal'nogo izmenenia prioritetov» [American 'Aid' to Russia: Time for a 
Drastic Change of Priorities] published (with certain editorial changes) by 
a State Duma legal periodical, the oldest Russian emigre magazine (in New 
York), and a major Moscow newspaper (see: Predstavitel'naya vlast' - XXI 
vek, No. 2-3, 2001; Novy Zhurnal, No. 223, 2001; and Nezavisimaya 
gazeta-Dipkurier, 22 March 2001 (the newspaper changed the original title 
to «Grustnaya istoria amerikanskoy pomoshchi Moskve» [Sad Story of American 
Support to Moscow. The U.S. Administration Provided Aid Not to Russia 
Herself, But to 'Agents of Changes']).  Its shorter English version 
«Something Wicked Comes This Way'. Sad Story of American 'Aid' to Russian 
'Reformers'» appeared on Johnson's Russia List, #5180, 1 April 2001 and is 
available at  www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5180.html.  The article is partly 
based on the author's report at an international conference at the Yale Law 
School in 1999.  (See: Alexander Domrin, «Counter-Effects and Deficiencies 
of U.S. 'Aid' to Russia: Constitutional and Parliamentary Aspects», What 
Role for the West? Promoting Legal Reform in the Former Soviet Union (New 
Haven, CT: Russia and Eastern Europe Law Forum, Yale Law School, April 
23-24, 1999)).
167  It's sad but true: «Americans have always seen Russian politics 
through the eyes of the radical Moscow intellectuals» (Jerry F. Hough, 
Evelyn Davidheiser, Susan Goodrich Lehmann, The 1996 Russian Presidential 
Election (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 1996), p. 14).
168  See Michael McFaul, «Pull Russia into the West», Christian Science 
Monitor, 26 July 2001.
169  McFaul began threatening Russia after a stunning defeat of «reformers» 
in the 1993 parliamentary elections and electoral success of LDPR which, in 
his opinion, represented «one of the greatest threats to U.S. national 
security in the post-cold war era».  «Failure to... rethink Western policy 
regarding Russia, - McFaul warned, - will be the greatest mistake of U.S. 
and Western foreign policy, since appeasing another fascist insurgent sixty 
years ago». And concluded: «Perhaps most important, Zhirinovsky's electoral 
victory has made fascist ideas respectable in Russian politics».  (Michael 
McFaul, Understanding Russia's 1993 Parliamentary Elections: Implications 
for U.S. Foreign Policy (Stanford University, Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution and Peace, 1994), p. 1-2).  Jason Bitter (of the University of 
Toronto) answered to McFaul when he threatened Primakov's government with 
«negative consequences of circumventing the democratic process»: «Quite 
frankly I find it rather insulting to the U.S. to say anything about itself 
supporting Russian democracy.  It has supported Yeltsin, not democracy.  I 
am particularly interested in McFaul's «negative consequences».  I am also 
interested in why the U.S. would choose to push democracy in Russia... 
while it maintains support for governments that are not democratic in other 
parts of the world.  They have no moral foot to stand on». (Jason Bitter, 
«McFaul on PBS», Johnson's Russia List, 21 September 1998; available at 
www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2389.html).
170  Sarah E. Mendelson, Western Assistance and the Development of Parties 
and Elections in Russia (Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Fall 1999), p. 5; available 
at  www.ceip.org/programs/democr/NGOs/index.html.
171  Michael McFaul, «West or East For Russia?», The Washington Post, 9 
June 2001.
172  Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., «The Feudalization of the State», 10 
Journal of Democracy 2 (April 1999), p. 39.  Paradoxically, the same 
scholar who correctly stated that the failure of American «reform strategy» 
«has probably destroyed Russians' trust in the West for generations to 
come» seems to believe that American strategists of «reforms» «do have a 
second chance» and points at China (with its possible future transition 
from Communism to capitalism) as a new object for Western «advice» 
(ibid.).  Hopefully, the horrifying lesson of Russia will have a sobering 
effect on Chinese people, and they won't give such chance to their 
latter-day saviors.