[A-List] fwd: paper by Alexander N. Domrin on Russia

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Alexander N. Domrin1

Ten Years Later: Society, 'Civil Society' & the Russian State.
Conference «Ten Years Later: The Development of Russian Civil Society»,
Wittenberg University, Springfield, OH, November 3, 2001.

I.  Grazhdanskoe obschestvo (civil society) is becoming a new mantra of the 
Russian government and the political elite in general.  The term is widely 
used in Russian political lexicon today.  A reference to «creation of civil 
society» or its «further development» is usually present in a typical set 
of arguments of Russian policy-makers endorsing certain political 
initiatives in the country.  Work on «developing structures of civil 
society in Russia» is regularly discussed during meetings of President 
Putin with leaders of parliamentary factions or with presidential envoys 
(as happened, for instance, on 28 June 2001 during Putin's meeting with 
envoys Petr Latyshev (Urals federal district) and Leonid Drachevskii 
(Siberian federal district))2.  Even the creation of a coalition of two 
political parties - pro-Putin Edinstvo (Unity) and Primakov-Luzhkov's 
Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya (Fatherland-All Russia) - was welcomed by President 
Putin for two main reasons: because it was expected to become an «important 
step aimed at strengthening and developing the political system, and 
creating civil society»3.
The number of registered public organizations in Russia has reached 
approximately 300,0004, including more than 70,000 social and noncommercial 
organizations, which are directly or indirectly involved in charitable 
work.  Charity organizations unite about 2.5 million citizens providing 
assistance to about 30 million Russians5.  Reportedly, the number of 
Russian regions that have formal cooperation arrangements with, for 
instance, groups working with orphans and the disabled, has risen from 12 
(out of 89) in 1998 to 40 in 20016.
Not by a coincidence, it was on 12 June 2001, a symbolic date in Russia's 
most recent history7 and an official Russia Day holiday, that President 
Putin held a meeting with representatives of wide-ranging (although far 
from being comprehensive) public organizations.  All in all, the meeting in 
the Kremlin was attended by 28 NGOs, including the Association of 
Beekeepers, the Allotment Gardeners' Federation, the All-Russian Society of 
Stamp Collectors, as well as those uniting lawyers, invalids, journalists, 
consumers, ecologists and even bards.  It was proposed to form a Civic 
Chamber attached to the Office of the President.  The Chamber is expected 
to become an important component of the process of building a civil society 
and of development of grass-roots activities of population.  Concrete 
preparations for creation of such Chamber are being made by Gleb Pavlovsky, 
a former dissident, «political prisoner», and now the head of a 
high-profile Foundation for Effective Policy, and Vladislav Surkov, a 
senior official of the presidential administration.  It's expected that the 
Civic Chamber will be preceded by a certain Civic Forum (or a Union of the 
Civic NGOs), which is to be convened on November 16-17, 2001 with 
participation of more than 250 NGOs8.
The current rapid intensification of dialogues of the Russian political 
elite and social scientists on civil society and problems of its evolution 
is not accidental.  Yet another stunning defeat of radical «reformers» in 
the Russian parliamentary elections in December 1999, and Putin's decisive 
victory in the presidential campaign in March 2000, are viewed by many 
observers as the end of «revolutionary changes» in Russia9.  In a popular 
expression, civil society is the point where revolution ends and routine 
(byt) of a democratic regime starts.
In a certain way, the term grazhdanskoe obschestvo is following the pattern 
of the use of another concept more than ten years ago - pravovoe 
gosudarstvo (Russian equivalent of Rechtsstaat or «law-governed state», 
«state based on the rule of law»).  Indeed, «civil society» is probably as 
often mentioned now as the words glasnost' (openness, transparency) or 
pravovoe gosudarstvo were used in the perestroika (restructuring, change, 
reform) period of the Soviet history in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Back in June of 1991, it was observed (in a report prepared for the 
U.S. Congressional Research Service), that «voluntary or involuntary lack 
of consensus on the meaning of the rule of law, broad interpretation of the 
term, and attempts to use it in political demagogy as a populist tool lead 
to outright abuses of the concept»10.  And just like perestroika itself has 
transformed in reality and public consciousness into katastroika (from 
«catastrophe»)11, and the «architect of perestroika», Michail Gorbachev, 
deservedly enjoys the support of not more than 0.5 percent of the Russian 
electorate (who voted for him in the 1996 presidential elections), 
indiscriminate use of the term «civil society» in Russian political 
doublespeak today can potentially lead to the same consequences tomorrow12. 
The more politicians speak about «civil society», the less meaningful it 
becomes.
As an example, let's consider two official documents of the State Duma: 
Plan of «Civil Society» Legislative Drafting 13  and Recommendations of 
Parliamentary Hearings «Russian Federalism and Problems of Development of 
Civil Society».
The Plan of «Civil Society» Legislative Drafting was adopted by the State 
Duma in the beginning of 1995 and contained titles of 31 bills.  Besides 
bills aimed at regulating the establishment and activities of public 
associations (No.1) and charity organizations (No.2) or formulating 
«General Principles of Organization of Local Government in the Russian 
Federation» (No.11), the list also included so different in their 
constitutional significance and scope of legal regulation draft acts as «On 
Election of the RF President» (No.13), «On Election of Deputies of the 
State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly» (No.12), «On Referendum in RF» 
(No.14), «On the RF Constitutional Assembly» (No.16), «On Alternative Civil 
Service» (No.3), «On Political Parties» (No.6), on the one hand, and «On 
Distribution of Erotic Production» (No.30), «On Prohibition of Propaganda 
of Fascism in RF» (No.26), «On Protection of Linguistic, Cultural and Other 
Traditions in RF» (No.28), on the other hand.
Similarly, parliamentary hearings at the Russian State Duma on «Russian 
Federalism and Problems of Development of Civil Society» (15 November 1999) 
led to an adoption of three sets of «recommendations» in various areas of 
social activities.
In the area of scientific research, the participants in the hearings 
recommended Russian scholars, among other things, to concentrate on such 
eternal problems as «humanism and federalism», and on such vague topics as 
«fusion of the energy of civil society with the policy of sustainable 
development», «federalism and civil consciousness of the Russian society», 
or «civil self-governing society - a condition of creation and development 
of real federalism in Russia».
In the sphere of information and mass media, it was advised to «concentrate 
on the necessity of a productive dialogue between political parties, social 
movements and the state power, between the Center and regions aimed at 
reaching political consensus between them», to introduce a special section 
«Individual, Civil Society, Federalism in Russia» in a number of Russian 
scholarly magazines (Zhurnal rossiyskogo prava, Pravo i ekonomika, 
Svobodnaya mysl', Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, Polis, Federalizm, 
etc.), to start a new talk show on TV called «Civil Society and Federalism 
in Russia».
Apart from long-term and, to a large extent, hypothetical and detached from 
current Russian reality goals (such as creation of «complex programs, 
federal and regional, aimed at developing and strengthening civil society», 
or establishment of an «institute for research in problems of civil 
society»), the third set of proposals («in the legal and administrative 
sphere») contained a short list of just six draft laws which, from the 
point of view of organizers of the conference and its participants, would 
assist Russia in moving closer to «real federalism» and to «strengthen 
civil society in our country at the contemporary stage».  The proposed 
bills included: «On Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Civil 
Rights and Freedoms, Constitutional Foundations and Principles»; «On 
Guaranteeing Consistency of Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian 
Federation with the Federal Legislation»; «On the Mechanism of Rendering 
Decisions of the RF Constitutional Court»; «On the Mechanism of Recognizing 
Unconstitutional the Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation 
Contravening the Federal Legislation»; «On Responsibility of Officials for 
Violations of Constitutional Rights of People»; «On Information 
Safeguarding Citizens' Security».
The problem with that set of draft laws is that, despite the fact that it 
includes a very small number of titles, two of them basically repeat each 
other (bills «On Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Civil Rights 
and Freedoms, Constitutional Foundations and Principles» and «On 
Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Constitutional Rights of 
People»), and two others intend to regulate very close aspects of law and 
could probably be united in one (bills «On Guaranteeing Consistency of 
Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation with the Federal 
Legislation» and «On the Mechanism of Recognizing Unconstitutional the 
Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation Contravening the Federal 
Legislation»).  It's hard to understand from the title of another bill («On 
Information Safeguarding Citizens' Security») what area of social relations 
it intends to regulate.  In case of adoption of the last bill («On the 
Mechanism of Rendering Decisions of the RF Constitutional Court»), the new 
act would most probably be eventually recognized violating the Russian 
Constitution.  Indeed, if the activities of the RF Constitutional Court are 
regulated by a Federal Constitutional Law («On the Constitutional Court of 
the Russian Federation» of 24 July 1994), the proposed «mechanism of 
rendering decisions» of the Constitutional Court could, in principle, be 
introduced not by a regular parliamentary act, but only by another 
Constitutional Law.  Yet, the Russian Constitution contains an exhaustive 
list of Federal Constitutional Laws (on referendum, on arbitration courts, 
on the Commissioner for Human Rights, on martial law, on a state of 
emergency, etc.), but the proposed act is not among them.
Finally (and the most important in the context of this article), it's 
totally unclear what all those bills have in reality to do with civil 
society, and in what way their adoption, in the opinion of the law-makers, 
would contribute to development of civil society in Russia or its 
«strengthening».

II.  The concept of civil society has a longer history in transitional 
regimes of Central and Eastern Europe.  Already in the late 1970s, the 
civil society doctrine was understood as a program of resistance to the 
Communist government in Poland.  To a large extent, the «velvet 
revolutions» themselves were «carried out in the name of 'civil' society»14.
Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, where such terms as «civil society», 
«citizen's committees», «citizen's assemblies», «citizen's initiatives», 
etc. were the «most frequently used terms in the public discourse of that 
time»15, revolutionary (in their essence) legal and political reforms were 
initiated at the end of the 1980s in the USSR not under «civic» slogans, 
but under slogans of Soviet transition to «democracy» and the «rule of 
law»16.  The term «democratic» was present in the titles of the most 
radical groups and movements in the country: from Novodvorskaya's schizoid 
Democratic Union to massive (at that time) Democratic Russia and from the 
Social Democratic Platform of the CPSU to Travkin's Democratic Party of 
Russia and Rutskoy's «Communists for Democracy».  Symbolically, one of the 
very first political groups that used the term grazhdansky in its title was 
Grazhdansky soyuz (the Civic Union), the most promising and influential 
democratic organization standing in the opposition to domestic and foreign 
policy of the Russian government in general, and to the disastrous course 
of Chubais' privatization and the experiments of market bolshevists17 with 
the Russian economy in particular18.  Refusal of Yeltsin and his radical 
supporters to hold a dialogue with the Civic Union in the second half of 
1992 marginalized Russian politics and channelled governmental economic and 
social policy to predominantly confrontational and eventually violent forms.
With the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, internal 
content of the idea of civil society so drastically changed that some 
authors even began speaking about the «fall of the concept of civil 
society»19.  This observation is probably correct if we mean an exclusively 
negative, destructive component of the concept - a denial of the state per 
se as an apparatus of force; mobilization of societal resistance aimed at 
overthrowing the state.  However, in the words of Bronislaw Geremek (a 
former Polish Solidarity activist and subsequently the parliamentary leader 
of the Democratic Union, the largest of the post-Solidarity parties), civil 
society today «cannot and should not base itself on emotions, but on the 
building of carefully nurtured institutions... The main task now is 
constructing democratic mechanisms of stability».  And in the opinion of 
Larry Diamond (of the Hoover Institution), the «single most important and 
urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is not civil society but 
political institutionalization»20.
«Democratic mechanisms of stability» and «political institutionalization» 
are the key words here.  And in this respect the conclusions of Geremek and 
Diamond are highly relevant to Russia as well.
At the first glance, the term «civil society» is quite extensively 
represented in contemporary Russian legislation.  The term «civil society» 
has been used in more than a hundred legal acts and official documents 
(adopted in 1991-2001).  Such acts include at least 10 presidential 
decrees, half of which were issued in March-June of 1996 at the height of 
Yeltsin's presidential campaign21, two presidential directives22, three 
resolutions of federal legislative bodies (Supreme Soviet and State 
Duma)23, two resolutions of the RF Constitutional Court, and one resolution 
of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District24; three federal 
programs: on «Continuation of Reforms and Stabilization of Russian Economy» 
in 1993, on support to book-printing in Russia in 1996-2001, and «Culture 
of Russia (2001-2005)»25, and at least three resolutions of the RF 
Government26.
«Civil society» is also mentioned in numerous legal acts and official 
documents adopted in regions of Russia27, for instance, in six resolutions 
of Moscow Government28, in three addresses of regional leaders of Russia 
(Bashkortostan29 and Tatarstan), and in a number of other acts of executive 
or legislative bodies30.
Lip service to the necessity of developing or strengthening «civil society» 
in Russia was paid in all «State of the Nation» annual addresses of the 
Russian President to the Federal Assembly (1994-2001), as well as in the 
Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation31 and in the Doctrine 
of Information Security of the Russian Federation32.
Yet, apparently, there is only one federal Law - «On Education» (No. 3266-1 
of July 22, 1992) - that uses this term.  A quarter of all official 
documents mentioning «civil society» (to be precise, 25 of them) are 
international agreements, communique or memoranda (including those adopted 
by the UN, UNESCO, OSCE, G-8, the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary 
Assembly, the Supreme Council of Russia-Belarus Union, as well as a joint 
statement by Presidents Putin and Kostunica of October 27, 2000 in 
Moscow).  This figure will become even bigger if we add documents hardly 
having significant legal meaning (like an information report of the RF 
Central Bank of October 3, 1995, or four orders, three letters and one 
resolution of the RF Ministry of General and Professional Education and the 
RF Ministry of Education)33, plus those adopted by lesser institutions and 
organizations (like three resolutions of the Federation of Independent 
Trade Unions of February-March 1996, or a resolution of the 3rd Congress of 
Russian Judges of March 25, 1994 «On the Concept of the RF Judicial System»).
As a result, a comprehensive Dictionary of Russian Legislation: Terms, 
Concepts, Definitions contains about 25,000 legal terms and definitions but 
there is not «civil society» among them34.  Even the most fundamental 
commentaries to the RF Constitutions don't mention «civil society» in their 
indexes35.

III.  Russian legislation is not the only one having unsettled relations 
with the term «civil society».  The concept of «civil society» remains a 
matter of much dispute predominantly among scholars of philosophy and 
political theory.  Civil society itself is a philosophical concept (which 
is also used in political science and sociology).  Scholars trace the 
origins of this doctrine to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Bodin, 
Grotius, Gobbs, Milton, Spinoza, Locke, classics of French and German 
Enlightenment (Montesqieu, Rousseau, Pufendorf, Leibniz, Thomasius, Wolf), 
as well as to the system of civil society developed by Hegel36.  The 
concept of civil society is much closer to contemporary political studies 
rather than to legal research.  A sample search in just one magazine - 
Journal of Democracy in the 1990s - indicated at least 19 major 
publications dedicated to «paradoxes», «renovation», «democratization», 
«resurgence», «awakening» and other perturbations of civil society in 
various parts of the world, including Russia and other post-communist 
countries37.  On the other hand, publications dedicated to legal aspects of 
the concept in Russian or foreign academic periodicals and editions are 
extremely rare.
In legal terms, civil society does not have a strict definition either in 
Russian or Western law.  It is practically unknown in American 
legislation.  The term and its definitions are absent in such sources as 
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, Ballentine's Law Dictionary, with 
Pronunciations, Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage or in Brian 
A. Garner's A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage.  Burton's Legal Thesaurus 
contains 27 associated concepts of 'civil' - from civil law to civil war, 
from civil contract to civil disobedience, and from civil service to civil 
suit, but there is no «civil society» among them.  A fundamental reference 
edition Words & Phrases. Permanent Edition. 1658 to Date (1964-2001) 
consists of more than 100 volumes and includes «all judicial constructions 
and definitions of words and phrases by the state and federal courts from 
the earliest times, alphabetically arranged and indexed», except «civil 
society».  Black's Law Dictionary  is presumably the only known American 
law dictionary which contains a legal description of «civil society», but 
that doesn't help either, because that source defines the term as «the 
political body of a state or nation; the body politic» (p.1396) which 
basically incorporates the whole spectrum of socio-political relations in 
the country38.
Naturally, the fact itself that the term «civil society» can hardly be 
found in the U.S. legislation does not necessarily mean that civil society 
does not exist in the U.S.  It means, however, that civil society cannot be 
instituted by special parliamentary acts or executive orders and is created 
and nurtured in decades of social development.
Various authors offer different and sometimes contradictory definitions of 
«civil society» (or, like Bronislaw Geremek and contemporary Russian legal 
scholar V.M. Lebedev, refuse to define it or delimit its interrelations 
with the law-governed state at all)39.  For example, «moderately 
restrictive» definition of «civil society» proposed by M. Steven Fish has 
room for Gaidar's DemRossiya (whose role and legacy are favorably evaluated 
by Fish), but allegedly excludes «fanatical organizations and groups that 
seek to seize control of the state and rule exclusively»40 (emphasis added. 
- AD).  On the other hand, Alexander Lukin correctly describes Democratic 
Russia and other radical «'democratic' activists» in Russia as viewing 
democracy «not as a system of compromises among various groups and 
interests... but as the unlimited power of 'democrats' replacing unlimited 
power of the communists»41 (emphasis added. - AD).  Thus, Democratic Russia 
certainly meets Fish's definition of a «fanatical organization» and can not 
be considered a «civil society» group (or «civic group»).
Before speaking about the peculiarities of Russian interpretations of civil 
society, it's necessary to state that, despite all misunderstandings and 
periodic use of the term in political demagoguery, rehabilitation of the 
concept of civil society in Russian science and political life is certainly 
a very positive accomplishment in itself.  Needless to say, for many 
decades, there was no place in Soviet social sciences (including law) for 
an objective, unbiased study of such complex concepts as «civil society», 
«rule of law» or «separation of powers».  The dogmatic view on the nature 
of the Soviet society42 as a «society without conflicts» (beskonfliktnoe 
obschestvo) made any serious research of those doctrines irrelevant.  The 
Philosophical Dictionary (1975) described «civil society» exclusively as a 
concept of «pre-Marxist philosophy»43.  Sergei S. Alexeev, a Sverdlovsk 
legal scholar and a future Chairman of the USSR Constitutional Supervision 
Committee, insisted that law «by its nature cannot be above the state» and 
that rule of law is a «deceitful, false, scientifically untenable 
(lzhivaya, fal'shivaya, nauchno nesosyatel'naya) bourgeois theory».  Avgust 
A. Mishin interpreted the legal status of President in the U.S. and other 
foreign countries as that of the «constitutional monarch», a «somewhat 
atavism», a «sign of a philistine admiration for Crown».  In 1989, Moscow 
professor Vladimir N. Danilenko still argued that judicial constitutional 
review provides «wide opportunities for an assault on rights and freedoms»44.
One more general observation.  The Ideological Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee may have collapsed, but a typical partiyniy approach 
still has its staunch supporters among certain Western experts.  Just like 
the Communist propagandists were explaining virtually all negative features 
of the Soviet realities either by foreign capitalist conspiracies or by 
«birth marks of the damned pre-1917 Russian past», these modern activists 
of Western agitprop prove to be every bit as ideological as their Bolshevik 
predecessors and find explanations to current Russian problems in anything 
other than crimes and misdeeds of Yeltsin's kleptocratic regime45 or in 
mistakes of the «experts» themselves, for years providing Russian 
«reformers» with «bad advice» in «fatally-flawed macroeconomic policy»46.
In his paper «Market Reform, Democracy, and Civil Society after Communism» 
Anders Åslund repeats an old libel when calling the Russian parliament 
(which was dissolved by Yeltsin in 1993) «pre-democratic and highly 
unrepresentative» (p. 17).
«Pre-democratic»?  Unlike the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (elected 
in March 1989), the Russian parliament was elected after abolition of the 
CPSU Supremacy Clause (in Article 6 of the USSR and RSFSR Constitutions), 
without such «filters» as the system of «electoral commissions»47 or 
reservation of a third of all seats in the Congress of People's Deputies 
(CPD) for representatives of «public associations» (like CPSU, Komsomol, 
and other CPSU-controlled organizations).  At its very first session (held 
on May 29 - June 16, 1990), the Russian CPD elected Yeltsin, the most 
visible radical politician in the country, as its Chairman.  Upon Yeltsin's 
initiative the parliament introduced presidency in Russia48, granting the 
Russian president extensive powers, including those overlapping powers of 
the Union President.  The Congress also declared that presidential 
elections were to be held in about three weeks (on June 12, 1991), thus 
guaranteeing Yeltsin, the only all-Russian leader at that time, a definite 
priority over other candidates49.  It was the same parliament that 
«defended» democracy, Constitution and Soviet President in the days of the 
«soap opera» coup in August 1991, and then pushed dissolution of the Union 
Legislature and stripped the USSR deputies of their rights and privileges.
Democratic record of the first Russian parliament is unquestionable.  Half 
a year after formation of the Russian parliament, U.S. Senator Cranston 
introduced «Report of the Survey Mission to the Soviet Union (July 29 - 
August 3, 1990)» (prepared by the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI)) and endorsed the report's statement saying 
that «the legislature of the RSFSR is at the forefront of political 
reform»50.  Next year, Representative Schaefer «applaud[ed] the anticoup 
resistance spearheaded by democratically elected leaders».  He «especially 
regognize[d] the resistance displayed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Republic, led by its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov».  In the Congressman's 
words, «the legitimacy and authority of these democratically elected 
Russian leaders [Khasbulatov, Yeltsin, Sobchak. - AD] helped undermine 
crucial military support for the coup plotters»51.  It was Åslund himself 
who in 1991 described Ruslan Khasbulatov, Professor of Economics and a 
future leader of parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin52, as a «radical 
economist [who] ascended to political prominence with appropriate 
visibility»53.  In the words of Sergei Kovalev (20 January 1992), who was 
named by David Remnick «Andrei Sakharov's greatest disciple in the human 
rights movement»54, «for the very first time in its history, those people 
are in power in Russia who are elected by people and express real interests 
of people»55.  Kovalev himself was elected to the Russian parliament and 
chaired the Human Rights Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet.
Was the first Russian parliament «highly unrepresentative»?  According to 
official figures of the Central Election Commission, on March 4, 1990, 
6,705 candidates ran for 1,068 seats in the Congress of People's Deputies 
(CPD) - an average of more than six per district.  There were more than 4 
candidates in 300 electoral districts, and more than 20 (!) in 24 of 
them.  The reports of the U.S. Federal Election Commission and the New 
York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights recognized the 1990 elections 
of the RSFSR CPD as «the freest ever held in Russia»56.  In an independent 
opinion of an Irish scholar, «just as an abolition of the Party's leading 
role in society signaled the end of its monopoly on political life, so too 
the centralized Soviet government was undermined by the new parliamentary 
institutions.  Their creation inaugurated the final crisis of Soviet power: 
they challenged the legitimacy of central rule from Moscow and heralded the 
end of the Soviet empire... Indeed, the Spring [of 1990] election campaign 
... may be seen as the high-point of the democratic debate»57.
It's not the first time that Åslund defames the first Russian 
parliament.  He first dismissed it as «pre-democratic» in his notorious 
article of 1994 «Russia's Success Story»58.  Åslund justified Yeltsin's 
violent coup d'etat59, because, in his opinion, the Russian Constitution 
was «until December 1993, Russia's fundamental problem»60 (emphasis added. 
- AD) and, naturally, didn't deserve a better fate than it's de facto 
suspension in September 1993.  Similarly, in his conference paper Åslund 
refuses to recognize the Russian parliament elected in 1990 as a 
«parliament» at all and says that the first parliamentary elections were 
held in Russia «almost two years after [Russia] attempted radical economic 
reform program[s]», i.e. in December 1993 (p.23).
But the new parliament didn't meet Åslund's expectations either.  Already 
in the 1993 elections of the State Duma, the party of Åslund's cronies 
Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais suffered a catastrophic defeat (just like 
other radical «reformers»)61.  85% of those who participated in the 
elections voted against Russia's Choice, despite a disproportionate use of 
TV broadcasting and other media by the party.  As a result, when the 
investigation by Russia's independent Accounting Chamber (modeled on the 
U.S. General Accounting Office) came to a conclusion that Chubais' 
privatization (especially the loans-for-shares scheme) had been 
accomplished with massive fraud, Åslund didn't have any arguments against 
the Accounting Office's findings and dismissed them asserting that the 
Accounting Chamber «is alas controlled by the Communist-dominated 
parliament»62.  For information of Western readers: neither the State Duma 
(lower chamber of the Russian Federal Assembly), not the Federation Council 
(upper chamber) has ever been «dominated» by the CPRF (alone or in a bloc 
with other friendly parliamentary factions, like the Agrarian Party), and 
the Accounting Chamber has never been «controlled» by them.  And Åslund 
knows that63.  (More on other Åslund's myths and half-truths see footnote 
119)64.

IV.  Despite all differences in the understanding of «civil society» by 
Russian scholars, politicians, and legislators65, we can nevertheless try 
to formulate certain common and more or less accepted approaches.  Unlike 
their Western counterparts who consider civil society an «intermediary 
phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state» (Larry 
Diamond)66,  «an autonomous, self-regulating domain independent of the 
State» (Adam B. Seligman)67, thus placing a dividing line between civil 
society and the state, Russian scholars and policy-makers tend to interpret 
the «law-governed state» (pravovoe gosudarstvo) as a political 
manifestation (ipostas') of «civil society» (emphasis added. - AD).  Rule 
of law is unquestionably a key element in sustaining the development of 
civil society, but a law-governed state is viewed not as if it is separated 
from civil society, but as a reality, which is based on the 
latter.  Interrelations between the law-governed state and civil society 
are understood by Russian scholars as relations between form and substance, 
as a balanced, mutually restricted cooperation68.  Civil society is 
interpreted not as diminishing the law-governed state, but rather 
completing it69.  Overall, Russian scholars are hesitant to consider civil 
society as the uncontrolled realm of individuals.
Following Hegel, Russian scholars tend to conclude that civil society 
doesn't exist before the state or outside of it.  As if arguing with one of 
the above quoted authors (Adam Seligman), Oleg Rumyantsev, the Secretary of 
the (parliamentary) Russian Constitutional Commission in 1990-1993, wrote: 
«Civil society is not absolutely autonomous, because it experiences certain 
influence from the state, doesn't exist before or outside of the latter, 
but coexists with its obvious reality which in a way embraces it»70 
(emphasis added. - AD).  The state provides protection to civil society, 
including protection of citizens' life and health, and maintenance of law 
and order.  In Russian interpretation, civil society cannot be established 
at the state's expense.  The state is responsible for maintenance of social 
justice in the country and approximation of levels of material wealth of 
citizens.  With its protective foreign and defense policy, the state 
exercises its role as the ultimate guarantor of the existence of civil 
society and the Nation71.
Even Western scholars do not consider civil society as an absolute value in 
itself.  M. Steven Fish, for instance, speaks in quite positive terms about 
the absence of a «vigorous civil society» in Russia in post-Soviet days, 
which was an «advantage» for Gaidar's «shock therapy», because it reduced 
the «strong popular resistance» to «economic liberalization»72.  Indeed, 
Russian radical «reformers» (and their foreign advisors) cannot be 
consistent, sincere or logical when demanding creation (or development) of 
civil society in Russia today, because the absence of civil society (or its 
weakness) in the beginning of the 1990s was one of the most important 
factors that actually allowed them to exercise the pillage of the country 
under disguise of «reforms».
It also deserves mentioning that the Draft Constitution prepared by the 
(parliamentary) Russian Constitutional Commission in 1990-1993 contained a 
special chapter dedicated to civil society.  The Constitution of the 
Republic of Crimea of 1992 actually has such a chapter, and it was drafted 
with the support of members and experts of the Russian Constitutional 
Commission.  Naturally, there was no room for a chapter on civil society in 
the semi-authoritarian, superpresidential, «victor's Constitution»73 of 
Yeltsin74.
To be successful, development of civil society in Russia has to be 
accompanied by strengthening Russian statehood.  In Putin's words (from his 
address to the June 2001 meeting with NGOs), «Great Russia is a great 
society».  Russian people are tired of state weakening activities of 
radical social groups and organizations that came to existence at the end 
of the 1980s and in the early 1990s; those organizations, whose motto can 
be expressed in the words of an Osip Mandelshtam's poem: «We live but don't 
feel the country under us» (My zhivem pod soboyu ne chuya strany).  Richard 
Rose's 7-year-old observation that «if forced to choose, a majority of East 
Europeans would prefer weak and ineffective government to strong 
government»75  is no longer correct in respect to Russia.  One of the main 
reasons of a stable and guaranteed electoral success of the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation (and an important factor of victory of pro-Putin 
Unity in the 1999 parliamentary elections) can be explained by the fact 
that 42.1 of its supporters consider the KPRF program and activities 
«state-oriented»76, whereas only 21.6 and 20 percent of voters of Yabloko 
and the Union of Rightist Forces find it important that their parties will 
work for strengthening Russian statehood77.
According to a recent opinion poll, restoration of state power is 
considered the main unifying and mobilizing idea in Russia now.  35 percent 
of respondents named «the revival of Russia as a mighty global power» as 
capable of uniting the Russian people comparing to 13 percent who named 
communism and socialism, 7 percent who named capitalism, 6 percent - 
democracy, 5 percent - Russia's «uniqueness as a nation», and 3 percent - 
religion78.
Václav Havel's description of civil society as a «social space that fosters 
the feeling of solidarity between people and love for one's community»79 is 
very close to the Russian traditionalist understanding of the 
concept.  According to a contemporary scholar from Siberia, «civil society 
is a society of citizens having not only a certain level of legal 
consciousness, but a sense of national pride... love to one's 
fatherland»80.  A number of public organizations may disagree that their 
views are characterized by Vladimir Kartashkin81 (a well-known Russian 
specialist in international law from the Institute of State and Law and the 
head of the presidential administration's Commission for Human Rights) as 
«destructive», but that's exactly how they are viewed not only by the 
Commission, but by the overwhelming majority of Russians.  Although 
Kartashkin's statement was immediately dismissed by such NGOs (first of 
all, by the human rights group Memorial known for its disproportionate 
denouncement of Russian history and state82), the same approach was 
expressed by Vyacheslav Igrunov, a Soviet human rights activist, now a 
leading figure in the democratic Yabloko party, a federal State Duma deputy 
and Director of the Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies.  At a 
press conference of the Civic Forum organizing committee, Igrunov appealed 
to the Russian public organizations to stop «futile exercises in 
fault-finding» (besplodnoe kritikanstvo) and urged that they turn to 
creative work in cooperation with the state.  For many years, in Igrunov's 
words, the confrontational attitude was the most essential and 
characteristic element of certain NGOs, but now it's 
outdated.  Confrontation leads to marginalization of members of such groups 
and groups themselves, and eventually marginalizes the ideas which are 
exploited by such people and organizations.83
Even the U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty had to 
recognize that «there are, of course those groups which reject any kind of 
cooperation»84 with Russian authorities in their activities.  Such groups 
certainly have their right to «reject any kind of cooperation» with the 
Russian state, and the state has a legitimate right to call their 
activities «destructive».  It's clear in this particular case, which side 
enjoys people's empathy.  Failure to reregister (by September 2000) by a 
Yaroslav'l Oblast regional branch of Memorial and a subsequent decision of 
a local court to liquidate the branch (in July 2001)85 was favorably viewed 
by Yaroslav'l residents and didn't produce any major protests, meetings or 
demonstrations in Memorial's support.

V.  Western theoreticians of civil society, like Larry Diamond, agree that 
«civil society encompasses a vast array of organizations, formal and 
informal», and mention economic organizations (productive and commercial 
associations and networks) before any other civil society components: 
cultural, informational and educational organizations, interest groups, 
developmental organizations, issue-oriented movements, civic groups86.  But 
the state is not only a power structure, but an active subject of economic 
activities too.  That is true of any society, including Russian.  The state 
has always played a special role in the national economics of Russia, and 
the state has traditionally enjoyed special property rights in respect to 
state enterprises, land, forests, etc.  About a third of all property 
assets in Russia still belong to the state87.  According to Argumenty i 
fakty (quoting officials and experts of the RF Ministry of Property 
Relations), «where the state owns from 25 to 50 percent of shares, things 
go even worse than at enterprises with 100 percent state 
participation»88.  No surprise, that 79 percent of the Russians «strongly 
support or more or less support» strengthened state control over the 
economy89.  Thus, even from a theoretical point of view it would be wrong 
to recognize a regular economic organization or an enterprise as an element 
of civil society and to deny this right to the state.  Moreover, in the 
judicial sphere the state is accountable like any other subject of civil 
society: an individual citizen or a collective.
It can probably be argued that the Russian interpretation of civil 
«society» is closer to «community» in Russian traditional understanding of 
that term, especially because both words are synonyms in Russian - 
obschestvo.  In this respect, Grigoriy Yavlinsky's recent criticism (in a 
liberal newspaper) that Russia has a «defective» and «unstable» democracy 
which «is not supported by the majority of Russians», and that civil 
society is substituted with «the Soviet version of community»90 is close to 
reality, even though the same newspaper tried to ridicule him by saying 
that «the chief trouble with our democracy is the people.  Without them it 
would work perfectly well»91.
Indeed, as far as civil society and its elements are concerned, according 
to a recent opinion poll (conducted by the Public Opinion foundation among 
1,500 urban and rural residents in June 2001), only five percent of Russian 
citizens are active in public organizations.  Seventy-three percent of the 
respondents said they would not like to work in any public organization 
versus 15% who said that they would92.  A recent UNICEF report Young People 
in Changing Societies finds that young people are even less active in 
social organizations (or in sport activities) than in the late 1980s93.
The average Russian expresses distrust of seven out of 10 key institutions 
of civil society, with political parties as the least trusted (7%) and 
courts and army as the most trusted (40% and 62%, respectively) 
institutions in the country94.  Only 14 percent of Russians (every seventh 
of us) consider Russia a democratic state, with 54 percent saying that 
«overall» it is not.  Sixty percent don't believe that their votes are 
capable of changing anything95.  Although as few as 6.9% of the 1,500 
Russians polled by the Russian Public Opinion and Market independent 
research center (ROMIR) believe that a situation in which political leaders 
make arbitrary decisions as they see fit would be best for Russia, and 
although as few as 2.8% believe that military rule would be very good for 
Russia, only 9.1% of Russians (fewer than every tenth of us) believe that 
democracy is «the best form of rule despite certain problems it poses» (an 
additional 38.7% «to some degree» share this view)96.
An analytical report Attitude of Population to Federal Laws and Bodies of 
State Power prepared at the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law 
under the Russian Government97 indicates that 70 to 80 percent of Russians 
think that «laws overall do not work».  28.2 percent of civil servants 
recognize that they have to ignore or violate federal laws in their 
work.  70 percent of the population believe that they have to undertake 
illegal actions in order to guarantee their legitimate rights more often 
now than before the beginning of legal reforms in the country.  56 percent 
of the population (and 58.9% of civil servants) consider the government and 
other federal bodies of the executive branch the most corrupt.  Since the 
end of 1989, people's trust in the federal legislature has shrunk from 88 
percent (to the USSR Supreme Soviet) to 4.3 percent (to the State 
Duma).  Only 3.7 to 3.9 percent of Russians (4.8-5.1% of civil servants; 7 
to 8.7% of Russian elite) agree that Yeltsin's decade was a «necessary 
stage in development» of the Russian society98.  95.1 percent of the 
population (and 94.4 percent of civil servants) vote for a «decisive 
restoration of order in the country».
Although as many as 89 percent of the 1,600 Russians polled by the 
All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies (on April 14 -17, 2000; in 150 
poll locations in 83 areas of 33 regions of the country), «strongly support 
or more or less support» guaranties of democratic rights and freedoms of 
every citizen, an increasingly growing percentage of Russians (from 71% in 
February 1998, to 81% in April 2000) believe that order («even if it is 
necessary to break some democratic principles and limit people's personal 
freedoms to establish it») is the «most important issue for the country at 
the moment»99.
According to another opinion poll (conducted by Monitoring.ru), 68 percent 
of the Russians favor such a restrictive institution as propiska (versus 23 
percent who say that it should be abolished) and believe that citizens of 
the Russian Federation should have to register at their place of residence 
via the propiska system100.
War of kompromat between TV channels controlled by rivaling oligarchs, 
profiteering101, overcommercialization, de-intellectualization and a 
general degradation of liberal mass media in Russia, have led to quite 
expectable consequences - the second oldest profession has nearly lost its 
function as a means of expressing independent public opinion and, in the 
words of Oleg Poptsov, a veteran of the glasnost campaign and the president 
of TV Tsentr (under jurisdiction of the Moscow city government), «has now 
moved closer to the first oldest [profession] than ever before»102.  As a 
result, although there is no much support for introducing any kind of 
political censorship, over 60 percent of respondents (across all 
categories) in a May 2001 opinion poll are prepared to approve some sort of 
a preliminary checking or censorship of press reports and publications, in 
order to ensure «objectivity of information and a balanced evaluation of 
current events».  An even more significant majority of Russians (three 
quarters of respondents, regardless of their age or education levels) are 
in favor of censorship aimed at safeguarding public morals103.  According 
to a poll conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research 
(VTsIOM) in June 2001, about three quarters of Russians (72 percent), 
including Alexander Solzhenitsyn104, a symbol of resistance to the 
Communist tyranny of the past, Yuri Chaika, Russian Minister of Justice, 
and many other leading figures of Russian society and culture, openly and 
vigorously support restoration of the death penalty for certain crimes, 
whereas only 19 percent want it abolished105.  Another survey held by the 
same research center was dedicated to Iosif Stalin's 120th birth 
anniversary and had even more indicative results:  44 percent of the 
Russians believe that the Stalin era brought good and bad in equal portions 
to this country; 19 percent think that there was more good than bad; and 3 
percent more consider that era an absolutely good time.  This sums up to 66 
percent106.
Yavlinsky is wrong, however, when he emphasizes the word «Soviet» in his 
warning of a creation of «the Soviet version of community» (emphasis added. 
- AD) for what was described above as a current interpretation of civil 
society in Russia is closer in its essence to a traditional Russian, rather 
than the Soviet version of a community.
It is true that at the turn of the 21st century, Russia (in many respects) 
lacks a developed civil society in its Western understanding.  The term 
itself for us in Russia has more theoretical than practical meaning.  A 
question that still needs to be answered by social scientists, however, is 
whether the civil society concept is universal and equally applicable to 
various countries and civilizations.
As Harold J. Berman has observed, contemporary legal systems are only 
surface expressions of deeper, broader forces of cultural evolution: «Law 
cannot be neatly classified in terms of social-economic forces. A legal 
system is built up slowly over the centuries, and it is in many respects 
remarkably impervious to social upheavals. This is as true of Soviet [now 
Russian. - AD] law, which is built on the foundations of the Russian past, 
as it is of American law, with its roots in English and Western European 
history»107.
Naturally, that observation concerns the creation of civil society (or 
community) in Russia.  It was already mentioned that civil society can 
hardly be instituted by a discrete legal act.  Luckily, Russia has already 
passed through the ordeal of legislative euphoria and normative idealism of 
Gorbachev's period; the tendency to view the law as a panacea for social 
problems, to make the law absolute without recognising the limits of any 
legal action108.  It's a recognized fact that legislation, as a rule, 
reflects various pre-legal norms and values (as well as prejudices) that 
are accepted by large strata of a society at a given time 
period.  Legislation can work effectively when it embodies socio-cultural 
principles that are accepted by the majority of the people.  If a new 
«progressive» or «reactionary» piece of legislation (usually in a form of a 
by-law or an executive legal instrument) is shoved down throats of the 
majority of the population or when people don't accept or understand it, 
such legislation in all likelihood becomes a «dead letter».  In the worst 
scenario, the law will not just be ignored and triviliazed by people, but 
will prove to be detrimental to the goals that were proclaimed by the 
law-makers themselves.
The RSFSR Law «On the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples» is probably 
one of the most notorious examples in this respect.  The act (passed by the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 26 April 1991) promised both «political» and 
«territorial rehabilitation» to the «repressed peoples» (repressirovannye 
narody) and proclaimed re-establishment of «historical 
borders».  Specifically, Article 6 of the law provided for «the restoration 
of their [«repressed peoples'». - AD] national borders which had existed 
before the frontiers were changed by an anti-constitutional force».  While 
raising a question of reconsidering existing «inner borders», the law 
provoked mutual territorial claims of ethnic republics and administrative 
regions against each other, and led to open local conflicts.  Behind a 
smoke screen of proud words about «human rights», «repentance» and the 
necessity to «rehabilitate the repressed peoples», the law provided the 
regional elites (often represented by ethnic minorities) with a legal 
sanction for the redistribution of territories, power, and property in the 
Russian Federation and for boosting their political and economic influence. 
Subsequently, at least two major emergencies were triggered by that law: 
the «Chechen struggle for independence», which actually began in September 
1991, and the Ossetian-Ingush conflict over the North Ossetian Prigorodny 
raion (1992-1995).
A recent reshuffle of the Clemency Commission of the presidential 
administration and a replacement of its former head Anatoly Pristavkin 
raised a new wave of criticism of Russian 'civility' in Western press.  The 
Pristavkin's commission was portrayed exclusively as «one of the few 
structures of a civil society», and as a «humanizing tool» in Russia's 
«failing», «notoriously corrupt, inefficient and highly dependent» judicial 
and law enforcement system.  Members of the commission were praised as 
«liberal writers and scholars who worked day and night, so as to save as 
many victims of faulty trials as possible».  Pristavkin himself modestly 
called his commission «an island of mercy in a sea of cruelty»109.
Sentiments aside, according to official statistics, the number of 
recommended pardons has grown from 2,726 in 1992 (when the Clemency 
Commission was formed) to 4,988 in 1995, 7,418 in 1999, and 12,843 in 
2000.  As a rule, all recommendations of the commission were satisfied by 
Presidents Yeltsin and Putin (in the beginning of his term).  Every Tuesday 
(the only day when the Clemency Commission holds it meetings), members of 
the commission considered between 200 and 700 (!) cases.  At least 308 
times, administration of the prisons or colonies objected to the 
commission's recommendations to pardon certain inmates, but they were 
pardoned anyway.  The percentage of petty criminals pardoned in 2000 upon 
recommendations of the commission was less than a quarter, whereas 76% of 
the pardoned criminals comprised of those who had been sentenced for 
murders (2,689), «assaults leading to a severe injury to the health of a 
victim» (2,188), banditry (1,848), robbery (709), kidnapping (18), 
etc.110.  One of the latest sets of 17 draft «pardon decrees» sent by the 
Pristavkin's commission to Putin (with a recommendation to sign them) 
included 2,565 names.  2,449 of them (95 percent) were criminals convicted 
for «serious and very serious» (tyazhkie i osobo tyazhkie) 
crimes111.  Recidivists comprised about 60 percent of the list:  1,070 of 
them had been convicted twice, 318 - three times, 81 - four times, and 37 - 
five or more times112.
For comparison, although the legal institute of clemency is known in most 
countries of the world, it's applied extremely rarely, in exceptional cases 
or circumstances.  The comprehensive list of acts of clemency (which may be 
a reprieve, remission of fine, commutation, or pardon) in 206 years from 
George Washington to Bill Clinton (excluding scandalous pardons granted by 
Clinton to 140 crooks and criminals on his last day in office)113, includes 
about 27,000 names114.  In the last 8 years only 0.3 percent of convicted 
criminals have been pardoned in the U.S.  In Germany 111 people were 
pardoned in 1994-1999.  Nobody has been pardoned in Japan in the last 30 
years.  President of France receives 25,000-35,000 pardon petitions a year, 
but satisfies not more than 1.5-2 percent of them.  Legislation of Great 
Britain doesn't know clemency at all115.

VI.  Although virtually all participants in the recent press conference of 
the Civic Forum organizing committee spoke about the necessity of 
«constructive cooperation» between the institutions of civil society and 
the state, full-fledged cooperation between them is still in the realm of 
wishful thinking.  If distrust was indeed a «pervasive legacy of communist 
rule», as Richard Rose claims in his article «Rethinking Civil Society: 
Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust» (p.18), it's even more so in 
post-Communist, «democratic» Russia116.  And it's not the peculiarities of 
Russian statist, conservative and traditionalist understanding of civil 
society that pose the main problem to an actual development of civil 
society in the country, but rather the current condition of the Russian 
society itself.
Vladimir Putin inherited a crushed, looted and humiliated country 
struggling to survive the liquidation regime of the «reformers»117.  The 
country, whose GDP has lost about 44 percent in just 10 years118, whose 
increase in mortality rates (60 percent since 1990) has been «unprecedented 
in any country during peacetime since the Middle Ages»119, whose population 
has been shrinking by up to half a percent a year120, the country which now 
stands in the 134th place among all states in terms of male life expectancy 
(by 1997, death rate among Russian males had equaled that of war-ravaged 
Liberia121) and 100th in terms of female life expectancy122, whose men have 
a smaller chance to survive to age 60 than a century ago123, and which has 
more homeless children today than after the Bolshevik revolution124.
An unprecedented social catastrophe in Russia, «a human crisis of 
monumental proportions» (in definition of the U.N. Development Program's 
report Transition 1999. Human Development Report for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the CIS)125, which was largely ignored by the Western 
community126, makes discussions about «civil society» in Russia today even 
more artificial and irrelevant than 10 years ago.  The concept of civil 
society certainly implies some degree of well-being.  Destitute people are 
unable to form a civil society.  At the turn of the 21st Century, the 
Russian Nation must consider how to stop the depopulation of Russia and 
overcome disastrous consequences of Yeltsin's regime rather than involve 
the country in another round of radical economic «reforms» and futile 
social engineering.  Otherwise, there won't be neither Russia nor its 
society, whether civil or uncivil.
It is certainly not true that Russia's socioeconomic catastrophe was 
«largely unanticipated», that the deindustrialization of the Russian 
economy was an «unintended consequence» of liberal «reforms» (Thomas 
Graham) or that «when the liberal experiment began, no one, either in 
Russia or in the West, anticipated... this strange and troubling outcome» 
(Martin Malia)127.  Warnings about the inevitability of such a collapse and 
about the suicidal character of monetarist experiments with the Russian 
economy were repeatedly voiced by the Russian Parliament already in 1992 
and became one of the main reasons of its violent dissolution by President 
Yeltsin.  A dissolution which was not only unconditionally supported, but 
encouraged by the Western «international community» in general128 and by 
executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government in particular129.

VII.  This brings us to the final observation - on the role of foreign 
«aid» in development of civil society in Russia.  Although foreign inputs 
can support creation of infrastructure to nurture fledgling democratic 
institutions, a truly democratic and civil society is to be founded on a 
solid domestic ground.  Democratic institutions derive their legitimacy 
from people and not from foreign sponsors of «changes».  The current 
situation in Russia, where the non-governmental sector «is still dependent 
on Western funding»130, is utterly unhealthy131.  A recent proposal by two 
American scholars to replace the «old formula for democracy 'Get the 
institutions right, and the people will follow'», with a new one 'Represent 
the will of the people within the state, and the institutions will 
follow'132, can be right only when the 'will of the people' is voiced by 
the people and not by their foreign mentors.  Colton & McFaul basically 
agree and repeat Peter Stavrakis' criticism of American «aid» in general133 
and of the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development in 
Russia in particular134 (never mentioning him or his publications, 
though).  The problem is that the proposed change of strategy of foreign 
aid from «technical assistance for the crafting of democratic institutions, 
be it democratic electoral laws, constitutions, courts, or political 
parties» to «pro-democratic elements in Russia's society»135, to «those 
brave people in Russia still fighting for democracy»136, not in the times 
of Peter Stavrakis' ground-breaking article, but in 2001 is a sly attempt 
to keep providing foreign money to the same small clique of corrupt and/or 
morally bankrupt pro-Western «reformers» (who were among the main 
recipients of American «aid» in the 1990s, but who are either no longer in 
the Russian government or on their way from it) under a disguise of «aid» 
to educational NGOs (like Gaidar's Institute of Transitional Economy), or 
public associations (like dwarf organizations of Filatov, Shumeiko, Rybkin 
and other «reformers» of Yeltsin's period137, survivors of his kleptocratic 
regime, «an authority of thieves or of people dependent on 
them»138).  Those very «reformers» who first looted Russia and then 
«conned» their Western sponsors139.
What American aid to the non-governmental sector actually means can also be 
illustrated by a Belarussian example.  Although the main (if not the only) 
reason for Washington's dissatisfaction with the current Belarussian regime 
is President Lukashenko's independent foreign and domestic policy, his 
refusal to follow commands from overseas and his devotion to creation of a 
full-fledged Union with Russia, the U.S. State Department in its public 
statements puts pressure on the Belarussian authorities not for that, but 
for the fact that they allegedly have «harassed civil society» and 
«abandoned» (since 1996) Belarus's «transition to democracy and the rule of 
law»140.  In plain words, Colin Powell's warning (made two weeks before the 
presidential election in Belarus) meant that the Bush Administration had no 
doubts as to the veracity of a new landslide victory of Alexander 
Lukashenko, the most trusted and respected Belarussian leader141, but 
indicated that it would never recognize their results142.  Surprisingly, we 
in Russia never heard similar warnings from the U.S. officials either when 
Yeltsin (an «explicitly pro-American, pro-Western, pro-market» president, 
keeping «Russia on a pro-Western track», as he was characterized in the 
U.S. Congress143) shelled the Russian parliament and suspended the 
activities of the Constitutional Court144, or when Russia's «dream team» 
(with support of American consultants and foreign money) staged the 1996 
presidential election farce145.
In a truly amazing admission, Michael G. Kozak, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Belarus, bluntly stated in a letter to The Guardian that America's 
«objective and to some degree methodology are the same» in Belarus as in 
Nicaragua, where the U.S. backed the Contras against the left-wing 
Sandinista Government146.  Another British newspaper, The Times, reminded 
its readers that Washington's war against Nicaragua with U.S.-funded, 
trained and led death squads claimed at least 30,000 lives147.  Ambassador 
Kozak's letter to The Guardian 15 days before the presidential election in 
Belarus is an opening warning to the Belarussian electorate: vote the 
U.S.-approved way or face the fate of Nicaragua.
Kozak (also known by his petname 'Weasel' which was given to him by the 
late CIA Director William Casey)148  was a perfect choice to do this kind 
of work in Belarus.  Earlier in his career, he served as Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs under Presidents Reagan and 
Bush, working in Panama, Nicaragua and El-Salvador.  While Kozak was 
serving in Nicaragua, Reagan famously compared the Contras to the French 
Resistance fighters.  Has America already forgotten this shameful episode 
of its modern history?
Kozak's letter gives a reason to see in a much more concrete light the 
remark of NATO official Jamie Shea, reportedly made during his address to 
the Cambridge Club in November 2000.  According to Kommersant-Daily (21, 24 
November 2000), Shea told the club that NATO helped the Yugoslav opposition 
elect Vojislav Kostunica and that «Belarus might become the next country 
where a similar tactic can be applied»149.  In fact, Ian Traynor, a Moscow 
correspondent of The Guardian, also comes to a conclusion that the American 
anti-Lukashenko «strategy repeated in exact detail the tactics the U.S. 
used to help the Serbian opposition overthrow Slobodan Milosevic a year 
ago, and the Nicaraguan opposition unseat Daniel Ortega in 
1990»150.  Another British observer confirms: «Some Americans view Belarus 
as another Serbia - and indeed, officials responsible for Serbia and 
Belarus were united at a U.S. State Department meeting in February»151.
A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Minsk told The Times that the embassy 
helped to fund 300 non-governmental organizations and admitted that «some» 
of them were linked to those who were «seeking political 
change»152.  «Helped» is certainly an understatement here.  Radio Free 
Europe / Radio Liberty is more precise: «Many groups in Belarus rely on 
foreign money for their activities»153.  Christian Science Monitor revealed 
that Washington spent $24 million in 2000 to support NGOs and opposition 
groups in Belarus, and is going to spend even more this year.  And 
according to The Guardian, «about $50m (£35m) in US aid has gone to various 
Belarus opposition organisations in the past two years»154.  That's in the 
country where National Bank reserves do not exceed $200 million!155  To 
what extent such groups, created and funded by the U.S. in Belarus can be 
considered «independent» (i.e. «not governed by a foreign power; 
self-governing; free from the influence, guidance, or control of another or 
others; self-reliant») is certainly a big question.
To make things more understandable to American readers, 300 
Washington-funded NGOs is one organization for every 34,000 citizens of a 
10-million republic.  What would be the reaction of American people and the 
Bush Administration if some foreign country (for instance, Libya or Iraq, 
whose governments are as friendly to the U.S., as the U.S. government to 
Belarus) would set up and provide multibillion funding to some 8,250 «civil 
society» groups (one for every 34,000 Americans) aimed at «seeking 
political change» (read: «overthrowing the President», «changing the 
political regime») in the U.S.?
There is nothing unusual in President Lukashenko's Decree No.8 of March 12, 
2001 «On Certain Measures of Regulation of the Procedure of Receipt and Use 
of Foreign Gratuitous Aid».  The decree consists of 5 articles.  It enlists 
a wide variety of activities that can be funded by foreign aid but outlaws 
the use of foreign funds for electoral or conspiratorial purposes 
(art.4).  All that NGOs need to do is to register foreign aid with the 
presidential Department for Humanitarian Activities (art.1.2) and keep 
funds in approved state banks (art.2)156.  There is nothing «draconian»157 
about the decree either.  On the contrary, it should have been issued long 
before.  And it was in complete accordance with Article 4 of the decree 
that on July 12, 2001, Belarus authorities seized U.S.-supplied equipment 
(which had been leased by the U.S. Embassy Democracy Commission to a 
newspaper in Krichev) designed to «assist the country's democratic 
opposition ahead of Sept. 9 presidential elections».  Rather than being 
embarrassed that the U.S. Embassy had been caught violating Belarussian 
sovereignty and legislation, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher 
demanded that Washington's computers be returned158.
Belarussian «opposition» and its Western sponsors labeled the decree as 
unconstitutional159, but failed to produce any argument proving its 
allegedly unconstitutional character.  Why doesn't the Constitutional Court 
decide it?  Belarussian law does not allow individual citizens to petition 
the Constitutional Court?  Neither does the Russian Constitution of 1993 
cheered by an American expert as creating «a genuine western democracy», «a 
true federation», protecting «all basic civil rights... not only in theory 
as they did in the past, but in practice as is true in western democracies»160.
The empire strikes back!  Often correctly criticized, Lukashenko's 
Constitution of Belarus161 is just a stronger version of Yeltsin's 
Constitution162.  What was viewed in the West as a perfect Constitution for 
an «explicitly pro-American, pro-Western, pro-market» president of Russia 
(«a corrupt but friendly drunk», as he is called by American press 
today163, «a selfish arrogant bully... destined to bankrupt the country... 
corrupt, venal... half dead and often incoherent», but «our guy»164), 
back-lashed and became counter-productive to American interests when the 
same or similar constitutional provisions were endorsed by a more 
independent (not corrupt and much sober) national leader of Belarus165.
The Belarussian experience with foreign interference in internal affairs of 
that republic under disguise of Western «aid» to «civil society» groups is 
not so much different from the Russian experience166.  The continuation of 
U.S. reliance on a narrow circle of pro-Western liberal intelligentsia and 
«agents of democratic change» (mainly concentrated in Moscow and half a 
dozen of other urban centers)167 proves to be wasteful, eventually 
unproductive for the U.S. interests (if those interests are not aimed at 
the ultimate subordination of Russia and further aggravation of her 
socio-economic problems) and detrimental to the interests of long-term 
institutional legal and democratic development of Russia, including 
development of her civil society.  What Western governments and experts 
should do instead of continuing their futile (and ridiculous) attempts to 
«pull Russia into the West»168, threatening Russia with «negative 
consequences»169, and frightening themselves and their communities with 
horror stories that if Russia does not continue «reforms» «following 
strategies developed in Western capitals»170, then «it most likely will 
have become a dictatorship and a threat to Europe»171, is rather follow the 
advice of Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. (of Johns Hopkins University's School 
of Advanced International Studies): «Those of us who care about the advance 
of democracy in the world should make it our foremost intellectual and 
practical task to find out why our reform strategy went wrong in so much of 
the former Soviet bloc»172.